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Second Debate: Defense Department Briefing Book (2)
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Second Debate: Defense Department Briefing Book (2)
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White House Special Files Unit Files
Ford - Carter Debates Files
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (4/4/1949 - )
Armaments
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder "Second Debate: Defense Department
Briefing Book (2)" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DOCUMENT
DATE
RESTRICTION
briefing
Soviet Cruise Missiles Declasified 3/21/96
3 pages
9/14/78
A
-
2. briefing
ALCM/SLCM sanitized 3/21/96
2 pages
9/14/76
A
3. briefing
Jordan HAWK Missile Purchase
2 pages
9/8/76
A
4. briefing
MBFR-French Issue Declasified 3/21/96
1 page
8/5/76
A
5. briefing
Most Recent Soviet MBFR Proposals
Declassified
3/21/96
2 pa ges
8/5/76
A
6. briefing
Phálippine Base Negotiations
2 pages
8/5/76
A
7. briefing
Relationship with Thailand
1 page
7/20/76
A
8. briefing
Thailand Reconnaissance Activity
1 page
7/20/76
A
FILE LOCATION
Special Files, Ford-Carter Debate Files
Second Debate--DOD Briefing Book (Q)
(box 2)
plc 3/28/84
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12065 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 1-81)
September 15, 1976
SUBJECT: SALT Talk Prospects
QUESTION: Recent news reports indicate possibilities for a SALT TWO
agreement prior to the November elections. Is this likely?
Can we expect a SALT Agreement with the Soviets in the
coming months?
ANSWER: The Administration is continuing in its efforts to
negotiate a mutually acceptable SALT TWO Agreement with the Soviets.
However, the Backfire and Cruise Missile issues continue to be major
obstacles. We would hope, of course, that these differences could
be resolved in the coming months but a particular timetable has not
been established. Even if agreement in principle could be reached
on these two issues today, there would still be a great deal of work
to be done to transform those principles into formal agreement
language. Although not out of the question, I believe it is unlikely
that a final agreement could be ready for signature before the end
of the year.
BACKGROUND: None
SOURCE: DoD SALT Task Force
COORDINATION: Dr. James P. Wade, Jr., Director, DoD SALT Task Force
September 14, 1976
SUBJECT: Possible Deployment of Soviet SS-20 MIRV IRBM's
QUESTION: A recent ACDA report deals with deployment of Soviet
SS-20's. Is the report true? Why was it announced by
ACDA rather than DoD? What is the DoD reaction to the
report? If it is true, what does it do to the balance
of forces in Europe?
ANSWER: The ACDA report has been read as saying that older Soviet
IRBMs, the SS-4s and 5s, are being MIRVed. They are not. As for
the SS-X-20, it is equipped with MIRVs. However, deployment has not
begun, although the Soviets are believed to be about ready to start.
There is no conflict between this information and the Secretary of
Defense's January report.
The DoD called public attention to the SS-X-20 in the Annual
Defense Department Report FY 1977, published in January 1976.
The information in the ACDA report is consistent with DoD views
on the subject expressed in the Annual Defense Department Report
FY 1977.
No detailed DoD assessment has yet been made of the impact of
SS-X-20 deployment on the balance of forces in Europe. We are still
collecting and evaluating intelligence information on the capability
of the missile. If deployed in large numbers, the SS-X-20 would
represent a significant development in Soviet nuclear capabilities.
BACKGROUND: None
(continued)
2
SUBJECT: Possible Deployment of Soviet SS-20 MIRV IRBM's (Cont'd)
SOURCE: Mr. Kangas, DoD SALT Task Force
COORDINATION: Dr. Wade, Director, DoD SALT Task Force
September 14, 1976
SUBJECT: Soviet SALT Response
QUESTION: Can you provide a comment on the status of the U.S.
response to the Soviet SALT note?
ANSWER: Meetings on this subject continue in the Administration.
I can report that progress is being made on the examination of the
Soviet note, but I do not know when the study will be completed.
BACKGROUND: This is Secretary of State guidance to his Public
Affairs Staff.
SOURCE: State Department, Public Affairs
COORDINATION: Dr. Sauerwein, Deputy Director, SALT Task Force
September 29, 1976
SUBJECT: Soviet Dismantling/SALT Violations
QUESTION: What is the current status of Soviet dismantling as they
deploy new strategic weapons systems? In doing so, are they guilty of
SALT violations?
ANSWER: Our intelligence information indicates that the Soviets have
dismantled or destroyed the required number of ICBM launchers in a
manner which would preclude their use for launching ICBMs and their
reactivation in a time period substantially less than that required to
construct a new launcher. We are continuing to carefully monitor
Soviet activities related to completion of all the detailed require-
ments of the Agreed Procedures. Certain technical aspects of their
dismantling activities are currently under discussion with the Soviets.
The dismantling procedures are quite detailed and complex. Our
concern is with certain technical aspects of the procedures such as
how much the launch site must be "cleaned up" following dis-assembly
and destruction of components. We will not get into further details
of these discussions at this time.
Additional SLBM submarines have gone on sea trials since May, but
this appears to have been after the Soviets had dismantled or destroyed
the required number of ICBM launchers (which should have been dismantled
before these submarines went on sea trials) in a manner which would
preclude their use for launching ICBMs and their reactivation in a time
period substantially less than that required to construct a new
launcher.
(continued)
2
The additional SLBM submarines on sea trials, of course, have
created a requirement to dismantle or destroy additional older ICBM
or SLBM launchers which are being replaced. We will be closely
monitoring this Soviet dismantling or destruction activity.
BACKGROUND: None.
SOURCE: DoD SALT Task Force.
COORDINATION: Dr. Wade, Director, DoD SALT Task Force.
SECRET
September 14, 1976
SUBJECT: Soviet Cruise Missiles
QUESTION: What is the USSR's capability in cruise missiles?
ANSWER: The magnitude and diversity of the Soviet cruise missile
threat is a direct result of an intensive development program
initiated in the years immediately following World War II. It is
aimed at the creation of a naval and Air Force capable of
(1) neutralizing the threat posed by U.S. aircraft carrier strike
forces; (2) obtaining control of the seas, and (3) providing limited
strike capability against land targets.
The Soviet Union has invested heavily in the development and
deployment of submarine, surface ship, bomber aircraft, and land-
launched cruise missile systems. Over a dozen different cruise
missile systems have been deployed to date and additional systems
are believed to be in various stages of development at this time.
Most of these missiles were designed as anti-ship missiles; however,
several were designed for missions against land targets.
Soviet cruise missiles to date have had maximum operational
ranges of approximately 600 km or less. The present Soviet technology
base shows that the Soviets have the capability to design, develop,
and produce a long-range (e.g., 2500 km) cruise missile or to modify
existing cruise missiles for the long-range mission.
REPLACE Boa.
MR 92-48,#31 OSD of. 12/6/95
(continued)
By KBH NARA, Date 3/21/96
SECRET
SECRET
2
SUBJECT: Soviet Cruise Missile (Cont'd)
The Soviets are expected to continue to develop new and/or
modified cruise missiles; however, the performance of these missiles
has not been determined.
BACKGROUND: Classified chart attached.
SOURCE: Mr. Frank Pierce, DIA ET-2B
COORDINATION: DIA, RADM Harvey
SECRET
SECRET
SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS & PERFORMANCE
(1)
CRUISE
IOC
LAUNCH PLATFORM
WARHEAD WEIGHT
SYSTEM RANGE
CURRENT RANGE
MISSILE
POTENTIAL
(Kg)
(Km)
(Km)
NOTE: 2
NOTE: 4
SS-N-1
1958
SHIP
900
240
SS-N-2
1959
SHIP
500
46
SS-N-3
1960
SHIPS/SUBMARINE
1000
463
1400
SS-N-7
1968
SUBMARINE NOTE 3
500
56
SS-N-9
1969
SHIP
500
111
SS-N-10
1970
SHIP
500
46
SS-N-11
1968
SHIP
500
46
SS-NX-12
1976
SHIP/SUBMARINE
1000
556
1700
SS-N-14
1974
SHIP
TORPEDO
56
AS-1
1956
BOMBER
1000
100
AS-2
1961
BOMBER
1000
185
1665
AS-3
1960
BOMBER
2265
650
1300
AS-4
1967
BOMBER
1000
460
AS-5
1965
BOMBER
1000
230
AS-6
1970
BOMBER
500
550
SSC-1
1962
LAND
1000
520
SSC-2
1956
LAND
1000
93
NOTES:
(1) US provided information to NATO on these missiles may differ due to
security restrictions.
(2) HE or Nuclear
(3) Submerged Launch
(4) Fuel exhaustion range. No CEP claims are made.
SECRET
SECRET
September 14, 1976
SUBJECT: ALCM/SLCM
LIBRAN
QUESTION: What sort of capability are we looking for in these
missiles regarding range, payload, carrier, etc. In
FORD
other words, what will these missiles be able to do when
is
development is complete?
07823
ANSWER: The Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is designed primarily
as a weapon for the B-52 force to enhance bomber penetration and
survivability by range extension and defense dilution and to increase
bomber effectiveness by the extreme accuracy of the ALCM guidance
system. ALCM is physically interchangeable with the SRAM weapon in
the B-52 SRAM rotary rack and on the B-52 SRAM pylon. In the former
case, the ALCM would be carried inside the B-52 bomb bay and can
deliver a nuclear warhead to a target hundreds of miles away. When
carried on the pylon under the B-52 wing, the ALCM could be lengthened
or fitted with a jettisonable belly tank to more than double the
existing range. The ALCM has a low cross section and cruises at sub-
sonic speed at very low altitude to avoid defense detection.
The Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM or TOMAHAWK) is designed so
that it can be launched from a submarine torpedo tube. The strategic
SLCM has the same guidance and warhead (and engine) as the ALCM and
hence the same accuracy and weapon yield. Because of the larger di-
mensions available within the torpedo tube, the SLCM has a range of
about twice that of the ALCM without the belly tank. The SLCM is
also designed to be compatible for launching from surface ships and
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
(continued)
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12903 See. 1.3 (a)
SECRET
MR 92-48,#32 OSD etr. 12/6/95
By ICBH NARA, Date 3/21/96
SECRET
2
SUBJECT: ALCM/SLCM (Cont'd)
land based platforms and is being studied for adaptability to the
B-52. In the latter case, the length and thus the range of SLCM
will be reduced in order to fit into the present bomb bay carriage.
BACKGROUND: (S)
ALCM
SLCM (Strategic)
Range
FORD
Payload
Accuracy
SOURCE: ODDR&E (S&SS)
COORDINATION: Principal Deputy Director, DR&E
Deputy Director, DoD SALT Task Force
SECRET
FMS
September 15, 1976
SUBJECT: Arms Control Impact Statements
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on charges by Congressman Aspin
that the Arms Control Impact Statements submitted to
Congress (August 9) are "totally useless because they are
absurdly superficial"?
ANSWER: The Arms Control Impact Statements, submitted to the
Congress on 9 August 1976, were prepared in accordance with the
specific requirements of Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Act. Although brief, they were carefully developed and phrased
to provide succinct descriptions of the programs concerned so that a
reader could quickly grasp the nature and purpose of each program
and any implications it might have in regard to established arms
control policy and negotiating positions.
BACKGROUND: The Aspin charge is contained in a 12 September New
York Times article written by John Finney.
SOURCE: Colonel Mahlberg, Assistant for Conventional Systems Policy,
Policy Plans and NSC Affairs Directorate, ISA
COORDINATION: Dr. J. Wade, DASD, Policy Plans and NSC Affairs
Directorate
Mr. McAuliffe, ASD (ISA)
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
This form marks the file location of item number
3
as listed on the pink form (GSA Form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet)
at the front of the folder.
August 5, 1976
SUBJECT: Senate Report on Military Sales to Iran
QUESTION: What is the Department of Defense response to a Senate
report concerning problems with military sales to Iran?
ANSWER: The staff report on U.S. arms sales to Iran just released by
Senator Humphrey's Subcommittee contains no information that is new to
the Defense Department. All programs have problems; the program in
Iran has its share.
Last year the Defense Department took action to improve the
management of this increasingly complex program. It selected and
sent out to Tehran in the autumn of 1975 a Special Defense Repre-
sentative, Mr. Erich F. von Marbod. The Senate staff report applauds
the Defense Department's initiative in sending a Special Defense
Representative to Iran.
Mr. von Marbod, who is a member of the staff of the American
Ambassador in Tehran, returns to Washington periodically for a
thorough review of progress being accomplished in the U.S./Iranian
Assistance Program. These periodic consultations will continue; the
most recent having just occurred last month. Mr. von Marbod, working
with Ambassador Helms, has the full backing of the entire Department
of Defense and the Services in devising solutions to any problems
that may exist and to those that may arise.
Iran is an independent sovereign nation state. The Government of
Iran, must in the first instance, determine the country's present and
(continued)
2
SUBJECT: Senate Report on Military Sales to Iran
future military posture to respond to present and potential threats to
the well-being of that country and its people. The numbers of weapons,
the types of weapons systems and the defense capability which Iran
believes it needs to deter conflict and to maintain regional stability
are judgments which are for Iranian leaders to make in the enlightened
self-interest of their nation. We give serious consideration to their
perception of threat and what they believe is required to meet that
threat.
The staff report prepared by Senator Humphrey's Subcommittee has
raised certain questions about Iran's ability to assimilate defense
weapons systems. The U.S. for its part is making a sincere, consci-
entious, continuing effort to provide the Iranian authorities with all
pertinent data about the training, construction, maintenance and logis-
tical support needed to procure and operate the various systems in
which their Government has expressed an official interest. The ability
to assimilate and manage modern systems and to acquire the defense
capability sought depends in large measure on the priorities which
Iranian leaders set and the way in which they allocate their manpower
and their budgetary resources.
When asked, the Department of Defense and its Representative in
Tehran provide data and advice to Iranian officials. It is the
Government of Iran, however, which makes the ultimate judgment on the
(continued)
3
SUBJECT: Senate Report on Military Sales to Iran
rate of modernization it requires and the capability of that country
to assimilate new technology of every type. As we have stated, we give
their judgment serious consideration in responding to their needs as
they perceive them."
The policy implications of Iranian requests are subject to
continuing review by the Defense Representative to Iran and those
officials in the Defense Department concerned with foreign military
sales to Iran.
BACKGROUND: None.
SOURCE: LTG Fish, Director, DSAA
COORDINATION: Under Secretary of State Athreton
ASD(ISA) McAuliffe
NATO
September 23, 1976
SUBJECT: NATO Standardization
QUESTION: It has been said that standardization can save up to
$17 billion. What are the domestic problems with
standardization? What are the international problems?
How can we achieve the optimum degree of standardization?
What are the issues associated with domestic VS. foreign
procurement?
ANSWER: I view improved NATO standardization and interoperability
as a major opportunity, and as a necessity for the Alliance. I say
that because of the improved combat capability, military efficiency,
and deterrence we can expect from better standardization. It has
been estimated that through a lack of standardization NATO loses
billions of dollars of its spending each year that might be more
effectively used to buy real defense capability. In addition, when
he was Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Andrew J. Goodpaster
estimated that we (NATO) are losing 30 to 50% of our capability due
to lack of standardization.
The obstacles to achieving these objectives are many. Most
national procurement decisions are sufficiently large that consider-
ations go beyond purely military aspects and cover such other vital
national-level considerations as industrial production base, employ-
ment, technology base and balance of trade. However, we are finding
ways to deal with these problems.
The major domestic concern which has been expressed is that
increased standardization will adversely affect U.S. employment.
(continued)
2
SUBJECT: NATO Standardization (Cont'd)
However, today we enjoy a substantial trade advantage with our allies
in defense procurements. This has had a beneficial effect on U.S.
employment. Increased standardization -- whether it is brought about
through increased purchases by nations from each other, or through
production of standardized systems on both sides of the Atlantic --
will not likely have a significant adverse effect on U.S. employment.
The sheer number of countries involved in NATO makes common
decisions difficult. Views on military doctrines differ. Time
schedules for establishing requirements and making decisions for
development and production usually differ from one country to another.
However, we are working to agree more often on what we need and when.
The optimum degree of standardization falls far short of total
standardization. Total standardization is not desirable for several
reasons. First, diversity of operating characteristics helps compound
an aggressor's problems, particularly in the areas of Electronic Warfare
and Electronic Countermeasures. Second, total standardization limits
the possibilities for maintaining competitive pressures -- so key to
cost-efficient products. Furthermore, on both a NATO and a national
basis, a high/low mix rather than total standardization of certain
types of weapons is required in order to provide, with limited resources,
both the high performance weapons and the adequate numbers of less costly
weapons necessary to deal with the threat. An example of this is the
high/low mix of the F-15 and the F-16 aircraft.
(continued)
3
SUBJECT: NATO Standardization (Cont'd)
Generally, the most satisfactory approach to contending with
domestic problems associated with standardization is through licensed
production of standard equipment in both North America and in Europe
-- examples, are the ROLAND II Short Range Air Defense System and the
F-16 programs.
Many of the benefits of standardization can be realized through
ensuring interoperability of equipment -- for example, being able to
service aircraft on each other's airfields, being able to communicate
with each other, and being able to use common fuels and ammunition.
For the equipment needs of our Armed Forces, we must continue to
select the most cost effective equipment available, whether of U.S. or
allied origin. When an ally system is superior, factors such as cost,
availability, mobilization base requirements, quantities required, and
statutory requirements will determine whether the item should be pro-
duced in the U.S. or procured from a foreign source.
BACKGROUND: Standardization has been a goal of NATO for a long time.
Previous efforts have met with limited success. One of the earlier
major standardization successes was the F-104 fighter, which has been
adopted by 9 of our allies. In 1973 the standardization effort
received new emphasis when Secretary of Defense Schlesinger pushed for
new NATO rationalization initiatives. Since then, standardization has
been receiving the attention of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the
U.S. Congress and individual NATO countries. the NAC organized a
special "Ad Hoc Committee" to review problems of interoperability
relating to: communications, jet aircraft fuels, NATO standardization
agreements, aircraft rearming, and tank gun ammunition. The U.S.
Congress has strongly endorsed the Defense Department initiatives by
requiring annual reports on efforts to achieve standardization.
(continued)
4
SUBJECT: NATO Standardization (Cont'd)
The main efforts to achieve standardization within NATO are
accomplished as bilateral or multilateral efforts. The most prominent
of these are: the U.S./Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) efforts to
standardize tank components; the decision by Netherlands, Belgium,
Norway and Denmark to replace the F-104 with the F-16; and the NATO
efforts to procure the AWACS. There are numerous other systems which
have common usage or planned usage in NATO. For example, the U.S.
developed MK-46 Anti-Submarine Torpedo (7 countries); the U.S. developed
multinationally-produced NATO SEASPARROW Ship Defense Missile (6
countries); the U.S. HARPOON Anti-Surface Ship Missile (4 countries);
the U.S. TOW Anti-Tank Missile (8 countries); the French/German MILAN
Anti-Tank Missile (5 countries); the U.S. developed, multinationally
produced HAWK Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile (8 countries); the
U.S. NIKE HERCULES Long Range Surface-to-Air Missile (8 countries);
the German LEOPARD I Tank (6 countries); the French/German ROLAND II
Short Range Surface-to-Air Missile System (4 countries); and the German-
British-Italian MRCA Combat Aircraft (3 countries).
Other systems with good prospects for wide standardization in the
future include, among many others: the U.S. PATRIOT (SAM-D) High
Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile; 155mm howitzers; U.S. AIM-9L Air-to-Air
Missile; Aerial Delivered Submunitions; and small arms weapons and
ammunition.
SOURCE: Mr. DeJonge, OAD(IP), ODDR&E
COORDINATION: DDR&E (Mr. Parker); ISA (Col. Larsen)
September 14, 1976
SUBJECT: Communist Participation in NATO
QUESTION: Why would (does) the U.S. object to communist participation
in governments within NATO?
ANSWER: Keep in mind that the raison d'etre of the North Atlantic
Alliance is to provide for the common security of its members against
possible aggression or military pressure from the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact. Communist participation in one or more NATO country
governments could profoundly change the character of this Alliance,
in terms of cohesion, a common view of the threat, and/or determina-
tion to provide the resources necessary to maintain a satisfactory
military balance. There is no secret about this. The Communists
themselves say NATO could not remain as it is once they gain power
and that the Atlantic relationship would be changed by their
presence.
BACKGROUND: In the past there was some adverse reaction in Europe
to U.S. statements about the consequences of Communist participation
in West European governments. We feel that it is essential to bring
to the attention of the general European public an issue which many
people would rather not face. The Communists themselves say NATO
could not remain as it is once they gain power and that the Atlantic
relationship would be changed by their presence. With Italian
elections now past, we believe it appropriate to be more explicit
than simply noting that the Administration position is a matter of
public record.
SOURCE: Mr. Jefferson, ISA (EUR)
COORDINATION: ASD (ISA) E. V. McAuliffe
SECRET,
August 5, 1976
SUBJECT: MBFR - French Issue
QUESTION: Is it true that France is delaying tabling of Western
figures in the Vienna MBFR negotiations?
ANSWER: In response to tabling of data by the East and the East's
request for Western figures, we have told the East that we would give
them our reply in due course. I have no further comment.
QUESTION: Are the French making difficulties about the MBFR
negotiations?
ANSWER: As you know, the French are not participating in these
negotiations. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for me to
comment on French views.
BACKGROUND: (S) The French has recently taken the position in NATO
deliberations that their forces in the FRG should no longer be
included in the data on Western forces used in MBFR or in the common
ceiling proposed by the West. This position has constrained Allied
flexibility to provide new data to the East. Allies are discussing
the issue with the French. The London Observer ran an article on
this development on August 1.
SOURCE: MBFR Task Force
COORDINATION: ASD (ISA) E. V. McAuliffe
BG James M. Thompson, Director, PP&NSC
Louis G. Michael, Director, DoD MBFR Task Force
E.O. 12330
MR 92-48,#134 OSDltr 12/6/95
SECRET
KBH
3/21/96
By
SECRET
August 5, 1976
SUBJECT: Most Recent Soviet MBFR Proposals
QUESTION: What is the DoD reaction to the MBFR proposals advanced
by the East in February?
ANSWER: The Eastern proposal aims at contractualizing the existing
disparities of the ground forces in the reduction area. The Western
participants continue to attach great importance to their own pro-
posals, which provide an equitable and comprehensive solution to the
major issues of these negotiations, including the requirement to reach
approximate parity in ground forces. The U.S. respects the confiden-
tiality of the MBFR talks; I believe it inappropriate to discuss
either the NATO or Warsaw Pact proposals in any detail.
BACKGROUND: (S) The February 1976 Eastern MBFR proposal includes these
provisions:
1.
Stage 1 (1976)
A. U.S./U.S.S.R. Reductions
-- U.S./U.S.S.R. reduce armed forces in Central Europe by an
equal percentage (approximately 2-3 percent) of the overall
numerical strength of armed forces of NATO and Pact countries
in area.
-- Units and armaments to be reduced on each side:
300 tanks -- 2 or 3 tank regiments/brigades
54 nuclear-capable aircraft (F-4/Fitter)
equal number of missile launchers (Pershing/SCUD-B)
definite number of nuclear warheads for above means of
delivery
36 air defense guided missile launchers (Nike Herc/Hawk and
SAM-2)
one army corps hqs with combat support and service units
DECLASSIBLED
E.O. 12058 Sec. 3.6
MR 92-48,# # 35 OSD ltr. 12/6/95
(continued)
By 143H NARA, Date 3/21/96
SECRET
SECRET
2
B. Obligations of other states with forces in Central Europe
-- All other states assume clearly formulated obligations to
"freeze" at present level the numerical strength of their armed
forces and to reduce forces in subsequent stage (1977-78) so
that in both stages all states will have reduced their armed
forces by an equal percentage. Reduction commitment would
define final volume and timing of reductions.
2.
Stage II (1977 - 78)
A. All other states reduce their armed forces by an equal
percentage
B. U.S./U.S.S.R. reduce additional nuclear weapons
C. Remainder of Western direct participants having means of
delivery of nuclear weapons reduce such means.
SOURCE: DoD MBFR Task Force
COORDINATION: ASD (ISA) E. V. McAuliffe
BG James M. Thompson, Director, PP&NSC
Louis G. Michael, Director, DoD MBFR Task Force
SECRET
August 5, 1976
SUBJECT: F-16 Co-production
QUESTION: What is the status of the F-16 co-production program with
the European Participating Governments (EPG)? Have there been any
changes in the estimated costs of the aircraft? How many are to be
produced in Europe?
ANSWER: U.S. contractors continue to meet with representatives of
industrial concerns in Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway
to develop an understanding of the European production capabilities
and interests relating to F-16 co-production. U.S. contractors
issued requests for definitive proposals to specific European companies
in the fall of 1975, and evaluated the responses. The national audit
agencies of the four countries and the Department of Defense are
finalizing the audits. Initial European sub-contracts were awarded
simultaneously in each of the four countries on 13 July 1976 totalling
over $469M. Remaining sub-contracts are scheduled for release through
the end of the year.
The cost estimate contained in the Memorandum of Understanding
for a European co-produced aircraft is about $6 million.
The programmed U.S. buy is 650 aircraft. The planned purchase
by the Europeans is 306 with options to buy an additional 42. The
co-production program calls for European industry to produce 40% of
its own planes, 15% of those sold to third countries and 10% of U.S.
aircraft. The Europeans will assemble their aircraft in the Nether-
lands and Belgium. The engines for the European aircraft will be
(continued)
2
assembled in Belgium. USAF aircraft assembly will take place at
General Dynamics, Fort Worth, Texas.
BACKGROUND: On June 10, 1975, the U.S. Government signed a Memorandum
of Understanding and bilateral Preliminary Contracts with Denmark,
The Netherlands, Norway and Belgium for the procurement and co-production
of the F-16. The F-16 will replace the aging F-104G's in the inventory
of the European nations. Initially, the Europeans will procure 306
aircraft (with options for 42 more), and the U.S. Air Force plans to
procure 650 and station 250 of them in Europe.
CURRENT STATUS: Status of implementing the European Co-production
Plan (CPP) is:
-- Definitization and award of European sub-contracts behind
schedule.
- Most major problems causing delay solved.
- European governments fund excess tooling outside
of $6.091 million not to exceed cost.
- Adjust exchange rates to reflect those on which the
co-production plan is based.
- Should permit implementation of approximately 90-95%
of CPP.
- Award of initial sub-contracts in July 1976. Award final
sub-contracts by end CY 76.
- Extend Preliminary Contracts (signed in June 1975) through
end of 1976.
-- Audit Reports
- Excessive time in auditing European sub-contracts could
cause further delay in contract awards.
- Corrective action: DCAA working closely with USAF and EPA
auditors in arranging procedures for accelerating the audit
reports.
(continued)
3
-- Future Actions
- Solution to audit report problem
- Finalize LOAs by early 77 upon completion of sub-contract
awards
- European support and maintenance concepts require refinement.
FACTS:
OPTION
Belgium - 102 aircraft
14
Denmark - 48 aircraft
10
Netherlands - 84 aircraft
18
Norway - 72 aircraft
--
$6.09 million estimated not-to-exceed in FY 75 dollars.
First European aircraft deliveries occur in CY 79, last deliveries CY 84.
Flight test to start in December 1976.
SOURCE: Col Preston, Chief, Programs Division, OASD (ISA-SA) X72314
COORDINATION: ASD (ISA) E. V. McAuliffe
General Fish, Director DSAA
Mr. Hero, OSD General Counsel's Office
LTC Pinkham, Air Force (I&L)
Mr. Lloyd, ISA (European Region)
GERALD
August 5, 1976
SUBJECT: U.S. Bases in Turkey
QUESTION: What is the status of the negotiations concerning U.S.
bases in Turkey?
ANSWER: The United States and Turkey signed a Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA) on March 29 and the agreement was subsequently for-
warded to Congress for approval. Following Congressional approval,
it will be considered by the Turkish Parliament. We are hopeful that
this process will be completed soon.
BACKGROUND: The President forwarded the Turkish DCA to Congress in
June. At present, Congress is not inclined to approve or even con-
sider the Turkish agreement until the Greek agreement, which is now
under negotiation, has also been completed. Even then, prospects for
approval are only fair. A feature of the Turkish agreement is pro-
vision for $200 million in grant aid and $800 million in credits over
a four-year period, with credits to be repaid at interest rates com-
parable to other NATO countries for similar FMS credits and guaranteed
loans. Turkey has stated that it will not permit the resumption of
suspended U.S. operations in Turkey until the Congress and the Turkish
Parliament approve the agreement. If the agreement is not approved,
Turkey has threatened to close the affected bases permanently.
SOURCE: Col Donald E. Majors, Asst for Turkey, ISA
COORDINATION: Mr. Glitman, DASD, European/NATO Affairs
LTG Fish, Director, DSAA
Mr. Bergold, DASD (LA)
Mr. McAuliffe, ASD (ISA)
September 23, 1976
SUBJECT: U.S. Bases in Greece
QUESTION: What is the status of the negotiations concerning U.S.
bases in Greece?
ANSWER: Our two governments signed, on April 15, a Statement of Principles
which defines the general framework for a new security relationship
between the United States and Greece. We are now in the process of
negotiating a Defense Cooperation Agreement, which will contain detailed
provisions governing the U.S. military presence in Greece and the manner
in which we will cooperate in the operation of the various facilities.
We hope to conclude this agreement in the near future. It will be similar
to the Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey signed last March.
BACKGROUND: Intensive negotiations have been underway in Athens for
the past several months. There has been much difficulty with issues
such as the degree of Greek control over the facilities and their
operations, the degree of Greek "sharing" or participation in, certain
military activities, cost-sharing, and U.S. access to the various
military installations. However, there has been progress, and there is
now some prospect of concluding an agreement by early October, but no
possibility of submitting a completed agreement to Congress before ad-
journment.
SOURCE: Mr. Jefferson, ISA (EUR)
COORDINATION: Mr. E.V. McAuliffe, ASD (ISA)
Mr. Glitman, DASD (ISA)
August 5, 1976
SUBJECT: NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Force
QUESTION: What is the status of the proposed E-3A sale to NATO? Has
a Letter of Offer been sent to NATO? Has any determination on price
and quantities been made? When can we expect final decisions on a
NATO AEW force?
ANSWER: The Department of Defense has prepared and forwarded to NATO
an unsigned, preliminary Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for the
proposed sale of a variant of the US E-3A. Although there has been
no final determination on the size of the proposed AEW force, NATO
requested data on 20 to 32 aircraft with an estimated program price
ranging up to $2.27 billion. As NATO further defines its proposed
AEW program over the next few months, we will incorporate appropriate
revisions in a follow-on LOA. NATO Defense Ministers discussed the
NATO AEW force at their June 1976 meeting in Brussels and directed
preparatory activity leading toward a decision on procurement at the
December 1976 meeting of Defense Ministers in Brussels. Contingent
upon guidance from the Ministers, a final LOA should be available in
early 1977.
BACKGROUND: On 23 February 1976, NATO requested a Letter of Offer for
the sale of a variant of the E-3A (20-32 aircraft) to NATO nations.
DoD notified the Congress on 27 February of the proposed NATO sale
pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms
Export Control Act. Senator Eagleton and Congresswoman Schroeder
introduced concurrent resolutions of disapproval, but the Congress
did not adopt these resolutions. The 20-day legislative review period
expired on 18 March; therefore, actions on the proposed sale are con-
tinuing. DSAA submitted, in June 1976, a preliminary (unsigned) LOA
to appropriate NATO offices to help them prepare for the June DPC
(continued)
2
meeting at which Ministers' action were in line with U.S. expectations.
Among other actions related to an AEW force, the Ministers noted the
Military Committee's agreement that acquisition of AEW is a priority
one requirement and agreed that they should make a final decision on
procurement at their December 1976 meeting. In the interim, NATO has
submitted a Request for Proposal for 27 aircraft, with preliminary
specifications on configuration, production rate, and industrial
collaboration. The Boeing response is anticipated on 15 September,
which should allow time to prepare a draft LOA for consideration at
the December Ministerials. The House Armed Services Committee has
directed that DoD take no action toward consummation of any agreement
to sell AWACS until 30 days after reporting the terms and conditions
of any proposed sale to both Armed Services Committees. DoD intends
to comply with this directive.
SOURCE: Col Dougherty, Staff Assistant, OASD (ISA-SA) X72314
COORDINATION: Mr. McAuliffe, ASD (ISA)
General Fish, Director, DSAA
MGen Pustay, Director, ATF
Col Koretz, AF (RDPW)
Col Larsen, European Region (ISA)
GENERAL
September 15, 1976
SUBJECT: Congressional Action -- DoD Budget
QUESTION: What is your comment on Congressional action on the DoD
Budget?
ANSWER: I am concerned about Congressional action to date regarding
the Defense budget in several respects. First, Congress has failed
to authorize certain programs that are vital to national security if
we expect to reverse the adverse trends between the Defense effort
of the United States and the Soviet Union. Second, the Congress has
added funds for programs which the President did not request in
Fiscal Year 1977, funds which should be used instead for the programs
Congress has not authorized. Third, Congress has failed to enact
authorizing legislation required by the President to restrain the
growth of manpower costs and to achieve other management economies.
As a result, there is a gap ranging from $3 to $5 billion between the
President's amended request and what has been approved so far by the
Congress. We cannot afford another year of Congressionally-imposed
Defense cuts.
That is why the President on August 23 found it necessary to
resubmit authorization requests totaling $2.4 billion to cover
critical programs which were not approved by the Congress in the
Authorization Bill. He also asked for deletion of programs
totaling $600 million, suggesting that those funds be applied
against the programs requiring authorization. He also said that an
(continued)
2
SUBJECT: Congressional Action -- DoD Budget (Cont'd)
increase of $1.4 billion in budget authority for the national defense
function would be required if Congress failed to act on the economy
initiatives the President has proposed.
With respect to the economy initiatives we are pleased that the
Senate has voted to repeal the 1% kicker and that the House Armed
Services Committee has agreed to authorize sale of the excess
strategic stockpile materials as requested by the President. This
is progress but of course both Houses must act on these matters and
there are still other requests such as the request for reform of the
Blue Collar wage system which if authorized would permit the
President to save over $1 billion a year by 1979.
We have noted that the House Armed Services Committee, Seapower
Subcommittee has responded to the President's resubmission proposal
by recommending that an additional $1.1 billion be approved for ship-
building. However, the full Committee has not yet acted and we are
hopeful that the full Committee will promptly reconsider its position
to table this matter. The Department of Denfese considers the
acquisition of these ships -- the strike cruiser, the conventionally-
powered AEGIS destroyer, and the four additional frigates -- to be of
utmost importance to national security and reversal of the adverse
trend.
BACKGROUND: None
(continued)
3
SUBJECT: Congressional Action -- DoD Budget (Cont'd)
SOURCE: ASD/LA
COORDINATION: ASD/PA and ASD/LA
June 8, 1976
SUBJECT: Recruiting of Minorities
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on allegations concerning quotas
imposed by the military to limit the entry of minorities
into the Armed Forces?
ANSWER: It is the policy of the Department of Defense to recruit,
train, and maintain a force capable of defending the United States
in any situation that may arise. Recruit eligibility is based
solely on the recruit's mental and physical ability to absorb and
retain vigorous military training, rather than on his race or ethnic
background. A racially based quota system for controlling the
minority content is illegal and the Services have not imposed such
a system. We are checking into the allegations.
BACKGROUND: Racial and ethnic representation in the military is a
matter of primary concern to the Department of Defense. While the
proportion of minority accessions in the Armed Forces as a whole is
above the total American population, an under-representation of
minority personnel exists among commissioned officers and the more
technical enlisted skills. This imbalance may reflect an inability
to attract minorities who possess the required qualifications. To
alleviate this imbalance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
has initiated a study to determine possible alternatives in the
recruiting and advertising programs.
SOURCE: Admiral Finneran, DASD (Mil Pers Policy)
COORDINATION: Same
September 15, 1976
SUBJECT: Panama Canal
QUESTION: What is the status of the Panama Canal negotiations and
charges the U.S. will "give away" the Canal under
Presidential orders? What is the DoD position on the
Panama Canal negotiations?
ANSWER: This is a matter more appropriately addressed to the State
Department or the White House. As you may know, the White House
stated on April 14th that Ambassador Bunker was not under orders to
"give away" the Canal Zone, and that any new treaty must guarantee
American responsibility for the operation and defense of the Canal.
However, I must refer you to the State Department or the White House
for specific details on the negotiations. As for the DoD position on
the negotiations, the Defense Department, as a member of the Executive
Branch, takes its instructions from the President in this regard.
These instructions are enunciated in the eight principles for Canal
negotiations signed by the United States and Panama in 1974.
BACKGROUND: None
SOURCE: Transcript, White House Press Briefing, 14 April 1976
COORDINATION: LTG Dolvin, JCS
September 15, 1976
SUBJECT: Executive Dining Rooms
QUESTION: What can you tell us about the new management initiatives
concerning the Executive Dining Rooms here in the Pentagon?
ANSWER: I examined the transcript from the press briefing with you
earlier this week and there is not much I can add.
As you know, all menu items in the Executive Dining Rooms are
priced 5¢-10c higher than comparable items in ARA-operated dining
rooms. There is also a minimum $1.50 charge in Executive Dining
Rooms. Moreover, eligibility for membership in the Executive Dining
Rooms has been increased for better utilization.
These steps were instituted to insure that no individual who
has lunch in an Executive Dining Room could be considered to be sub-
sidized. This does not suggest, of course, that the Executive Dining
Rooms are totally self-sufficient. There are numerous examples of
Pentagon activities which are subsidized -- building security,
janitorial services, parking lots, even press parking and the Pentagon
Press Room.
The new initiatives were designed to help offset operating costs
in the Executive Dining Rooms as much as possible.
BACKGROUND: Certain members of the Pentagon Press Corps have been
critical of the Executive Dining Rooms due to alleged subsidies for
senior Defense Department officials.
SOURCE: DoD Morning News Briefing, Tuesday, September 14
COORDINATION: ASD (PA) Woods
2
SUBJECT: Sale of U.S. Defense Stockpiles
If sales are not authorized the National Defense budget ceiling will
have to be increased accordingly.
SOURCE: Richard E. Donnelly, OASD(I&L)WP (57177)
COORDINATION: ASD(I&L), LA and GC
September 9, 1976
SUBJECT: Sale of U.S. Defense Stockpiles
QUESTION: It is reported that the Secretary of Defense urged Congress
to approve the sale of $746 Million of industrial diamonds
and metals from U.S. defense stockpiles in order to maintain
DoD's $112 Billion FY 1977 budget, although it will cost the
government three or four times as much to replace these
stockpiles in the future. Is that true, and if so, what is
DoD's comment?
ANSWER: Secretary Rumsfeld has urged the House Armed Services Commit-
tee to authorize the sale of quantities of Antimony, Industrial
Diamonds, Tin and Silver from the National Stockpile of Strategic and
Critical Materials which is operated by the Federal Preparedness
Agency (FPA) of the General Services Administration. Although actual
market conditions at the time of sale will determine the final price,
FPA has estimated that sale of the commodities will generate revenues
of about $746 million during FY77. A recent interagency study
thoroughly analyzed the policies and assumptions underlying U.S. stock-
pile inventory objectives. The quantities of materials proposed for
disposal are clearly excess to all policy options which were developed
during the study. Thus the stockpile sales will in no way jeopardize
national security. A need to purchase quantities of these materials
in the future, is not envisioned. If a purchase were necessary, the
FPA would do so in a manner so as not to cause a market disruption and
would pay the going prices at that time. Though not related to the
basic issue of strategic stockpile needs, the President's budget
assumes this sales authority and consequent credit of $746 million.
(continued)
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
8
This form marks the file location of item number
as listed on the pink form (GSA Form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet)
at the front of the folder.
September 16, 1976
SUBJECT: Funds in Iran
QUESTION: What can you tell us about the audit and investigation
concerning funds in Iran?
ANSWER: In May 1976, the OSI detachment in Iran was asked by the
local MAAG office to investigate an allegation of possible procure-
ment irregularities in connection with Assistance in Kind (AIK)
funds. AIK funding is support in the form of goods and services
provided by foreign governments without cost to the United States.
It may include, but is not limited to, buildings and facilities
occupied by MAAGs, utilities, communications, supplies and equip-
ment, travel, transportation of things, and services of foreign
national employees.
In OSI's initial review it became apparent that the scope and
complexity of the records involved would require a more in-depth
study. The Defense Audit Office, Iran was asked to assist. Some
of the pertinent files appear to be unavailable and apparently have
been destroyed. The circumstances involved are being investigated.
This investigation and the audit continue.
BACKGROUND: This information has been provided to AP, UPI, New
York Times, CBS and Los Angeles Times in response to query.
SOURCE: ASD(A) and Defense Audit Agency
COORDINATION: ASD(A)-Mr. Cook
General Counsel-Mr. Wiley
DSAA-General Fish
ASD(PA)-Mr. Woods
September 15, 1976
SUBJECT: FY 1978 Budget Request
QUESTION: Are you requesting a budget of $130 billion for FY 1978
(as reported in the New York Times September 15)?
ANSWER: Our budget process is continuing and at this point it is
too early to have any set total figures.
Our projection for FY 78 contained in our FY 77 budget figures
was $120.6 billion in total obligational authority. Our projection
was based on achieving a real increase in the baseline program for
FY 77 and in subsequent years achieving a four percent growth per
year in baseline program purchases.
All of our planning -- then and now -- is based on the nation's
objectives of peace, mutual security, and international stability --
while making every effort at budget restraint.
As I have pointed out many times, Soviet defense spending over
the past decade has increased steadily in real terms while ours has
decreased -- in real terms.
Our FY 1978 request will have to be assessed against the back-
ground of trends in the military balance worldwide. It will have to
be adjusted depending on Congressional action and inaction. As you
know, the Congress has added programs we did not request and they
have not acted on some of our cost restraint initiatives. These
will all be factors in determining the final figures for our FY 1978
budget request.
(continued)
2
SUBJECT: FY 1978 Budget Request (Cont'd)
BACKGROUND: "Pentagon Will Seek $130 Billion Budget" - "Request for
1978 is $9 Billion Above the Estimate" article by Leslie Gelb appear-
ed on page 1 of New York Times on Wednesday, September 15, 1976.
SOURCE: PDASD/PA
FY 77 Budget Documents
COORDINATION: ASD/C
September 15, 1976
SUBJECT: MIG-25
QUESTION: What can you tell us about DoD exploitation of the MIG-25
currently in Japan and the pilot who is in the U.S.?
ANSWER: Will we have a crack at that airplane? My inclination is to
not answer your question which is not my first preference. I always
like to answer questions. But given the fact that the Government of
Japan is in discussions with the Soviet Union about the Soviet air-
plane that landed in Japan recently, and that that's a diplomatic
matter between them, and given the fact that obviously there's an
interest on the part of various people in that airplane and that
complicates the problem of having it worked out well, I think that
the contribution I could make here to having it worked out well is
to keep my mouth shut.
As far as the pilot goes, he is in the United States under the
auspices of the Department of State, and I would rather not get into
any details on contacts he is having with government officials.
BACKGROUND: None.
SOURCE: SecDef Comments, Peoria Chamber of Commerce
COORDINATION: None
September 15, 1976
SUBJECT: Civil Defense Study
QUESTION: The Washington Star reports the U.S. is concerned about
the extensive Soviet civil defense program and the lack of a
similar U.S. effort. Is this true? Is a National Security Study
Memorandum being coordinated by the Defense Department? Does the
Defense Department consider the U.S. vulnerable to Soviet attack
without a civil defense program?
ANSWER: Recent publications including translations of USSR civil
defense manuals and the monograph by Professor Leon Goure, "War
Survival in Soviet Strategy--USSR Civil Defense" indicate the broad
scope of what could be an extensive civil defense program in the
USSR. The effectiveness of implementation of the USSR civil defense
plans cannot, of course, be validated before the fact. For a number
of years, the Soviets have devoted considerable resources to their
civil defense effort, which emphasizes the extensive evacuation of
urban populations prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the
construction of shelters in outlying areas, and compulsory training
in civil defense for well over half the Soviet population. The
importance the Soviets attach to this program at present is indicated
not only by the resources they have been willing to incur in its
support, but also by the appointment of a Deputy Minister of Defense
to head this effort.
Civil defense in the United States is a part of our Strategic
Defense posture. To the extent that an asymmetry has developed,
this can bear on our strategic relationship with the Soviets and on
(continued)
2
SUBJECT: Civil Defense Study (Cont'd)
the credibility of our deterrent posture. You may be sure that this
is under current review.
There is a National Security Study Memorandum on civil defense
being prepared. As in all such studies the direction and scope are
classified in part to protect national security information and in
part to prevent speculation as to the study conclusions. I have no
further comment on the NSSM effort.
If the Soviets executed a surprise nuclear attack against U.S.
population centers there would be large casualties. I believe our
strategic posture deters this type of attack now and for the
foreseeable future. The consequences of any possible asymmetry
growing in our mutual postures is being examined.
BACKGROUND: Excellent background summary of Soviet civil defense
is contained in the Foreword by Ambassador Foy Kohler to Leon Goure's
book, War Survival in Soviet Strategy--USSR Civil Defense. Ambassador
Kohler concludes that:
1. Civil defense and other war-survival measures have a
central place in Moscow's strategic thinking and con-
stitute a major element in its military preparedness
effort.
2. The Soviet Union has stepped up in very substantial
ways its war-survival program since the advent of the
detente (peaceful coexistence) relationship with the
U.S. in May 1972 and is today steadily increasing its
attention and resource allocations to the program.
3. The Soviet leadership recognizes and evidently attaches
great importance to the USSR's superior position as
against the U.S. in war-survival capabilities from the
(continued)
3
SUBJECT: Civil Defense Study (Cont'd)
standpoint of both scope and effectiveness of
civil defense and related programs and of degree
of concentration of population centers and vital
economic resources and activities.
4. The Soviet leadership believes that these asymmetries
between Soviet and U.S. capabilities can so degrade
the U.S. threat of "assured destruction" as to give
the USSR a distinct advantage with respect to risk-
taking in the nuclear age and improve its chances of
not only surviving but winning a nuclear war should
it come.
SOURCE: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)
COORDINATION: DCPA
ISA
September 21, 1976
SUBJECT: Swedish Payments
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on press reports concerning cash
payments made by the Government of Sweden to an Air Force general?
ANSWER: The Swedish Government has made it clear (in a September 14
press conference by General Stig Synnergren, Military Commander-in-Chief)
that the payments were made for electronics equipment used for intelligence
purposes. Further the payments were made bank-to-bank in a businesslike
transaction.
The Secretary of the Air Force has asked his General Counsel to
review the matter to assure the funds transactions were proper.
As to the allegations regarding General Triantafellu, they are not
true. He has never received nor handled funds either on a cash or
personal transaction basis.
BACKGROUND: Press interest arises from an article in a Swedish magazine
that the cash payments were for services or information and had been
done secretly to make the money impossible to trace. DAO Stockholm
reports that in his September 14 press conference, General Synnergren
made a factual and apparently persuasive statement. He adds that press
coverage of the conference produced no sensational new questions and
speculations.
SOURCE: Maj. Gen. Keegan, Air Force Intelligence.
COORDINATION: DepSecDef Ellsworth; ASD (PA) Woods; Air Force General
Counsel; Air Force Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Keegan.
September 14, 1976
SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Security
QUESTION: What positive steps have you taken to minimize the threat
posed by terrorists aimed at gaining access to a nuclear
bomb?
ANSWER: Until the early 1970's our security system for the protec-
tion of nuclear weapons was designed against a covert-type attack by
only a few individuals. However, in 1972 the Munich Olympics inci-
dent established the possibility of a terrorist type attack to either
damage, destroy, capture or steal one of our nuclear weapons for any
of a number of reasons--all of which would do grave damage, let alone
?
the embarrassment, to the United States and its national security
posture. Because of this additional threat, in September of 1972,
the Secretary of Defense required the Military Departments and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a world-wide review of the protec-
tion of these weapons. These site-by-site surveys resulted in
closure of several vulnerable sites and the strengthening of others
through improved procedures and self-help projects requiring limited
funding.
Those sites requiring further improvement and for those items
requiring major funding, a comprehensive upgrade program was under-
taken. We are currently estimating the expenditure of over
$300 million for this program through the fiscal year 1978 time
frame.
(continued)
2
SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Security (Cont'd)
BACKGROUND: Major items in this upgrade program include hardened
structures for the response force, hardened guard towers and entry
positions, dual sensor detection systems for those sites lacking
them, more fencing and lighting, and protection for emergency back-
up electrical power.
SOURCE: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)
COORDINATION: ASD (Comptroller)
September 14, 1976
SUBJECT: Article in 14 September issue of Washington Post entitled,
"Schools Impede Recruiting, Marine Generals Complain"
QUESTION: Do military recruiters have adequate access to high
schools?
ANSWER: There are schools which do not grant access to military
recruiters. The majority of high schools, however, permit varying
degrees of access. In 1976, 16,000 of the 19,000 high schools per-
mitted the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) to be
administered. The ASVAB is the entrance test given by all military
services to determine aptitude and mental category of potential
enlistees. This indicates some success in recruiters' access to
schools, although that access may not always be as free and open as
we would like.
BACKGROUND: The 14 September issue of the Washington Post carried
an article by George Wilson covering a Marine Corps recruiting con-
ference at Parris Island. The Marine officials are reported to have
discussed the problem of schools which close their doors to recruiters.
SOURCE: Colonel W. B. Womack, USAF, OASD (M&RA), ODASD(MPP), A&R
COORDINATION: V/Adm. J. G. Finneran, USN, DASD (MPP)
September 9, 1976
SUBJECT: Air Force Academy Theft and Forgery Ring
QUESTION: What can you say about the alleged theft and forgery ring
at the Air Force Academy?
ANSWER: The Air Force considers these allegations serious and has
initiated a full-scale investigation. This investigation is being
conducted by an official Air Force investigatory agency independent
of the Academy.
BACKGROUND: On August 26, 1976, the Superintendent of the Air Force
Academy received a letter from Mr. Edward Joel Meyer (a lawyer who
represented a cadet accused of being a forger), containing allega-
tions regarding the existence of a series of forgeries and thefts
which took place at the Air Force Academy during the 1973-74 time
period. The following day, August 27, 1976, the Superintendent
initiated a full-scale investigation of these allegations. The
investigation will encompass the entire time period from 1972
through the present.
SOURCE: Superintendent, USAF Academy
COORDINATION: Superintendent, USAF Academy
USAF Academy Group
September 14, 1976
SUBJECT: Denial of criminal justice information to recruiters as a
major impediment to attaining a quality force
QUESTION: To what degree are military recruiters denied access to
criminal justice information concerning enlistment
applicants?
ANSWER: An Army survey in 1974 indicated that twenty states did not
provide recruiters information concerning juvenile offenses, an addi-
tional five states permitted the sealing or expunging of juvenile
records, and eighteen additional states left release of juvenile
records to the discretion of local jurisdictions. It was estimated
that Army recruiters were precluded from completing police record
checks on 60% of its accessions.
BACKGROUND: The underlying purpose of moral standards -- which have
been essentially unchanged over the years -- is to minimize entrance
of persons who are likely to become serious disciplinary cases and
thus divert resources from the performance of military missions.
Then, too, the Services feel a responsibility to parents who have a
right to expect that their children will not be thrown into close
association with men who have committed serious offenses or whose
records show ingrained delinquency behavior patterns. Under the
provisions of 10 U.S.C. 504, no person convicted of a felony can be
enlisted in the military service. However, by definition juvenile
offenders are not felons. The Secretaries of the Military Services
can authorize exceptions, and the Services have established procedures
for the enlistment of individuals with criminal records who have
demonstrated their rehabilitation.
A 1975 survey of Defense Investigative Service (DIS) field representa-
tives showed thirty-four states and the District of Columbia denied
these investigators access to juvenile and/or youthful offender
records. Two additional states deny information concerning discussed,
non-processed and findings of not guilty. About 70% of our accessions
come from these 36 states and the District of Columbia.
SOURCE: Colonel W. G. Womack, USAF, OASD (M&RA), ODASD (MPP) A&R
COORDINATION: V/Adm J. G. Finneran, USA, DASD (MPP)
September 9, 1976
SUBJECT: Litton Shipbuilding Lawsuits
QUESTION: What can you tell us about the status of the suit which
Litton brought against the government on shipbuilding?
ANSWER: Several weeks ago Litton filed suit in Los Angeles seeking
to stop work, as of August 1, 1976, on their contract with the Navy
to build LHAs.
After careful consideration of all aspects of this situation,
the government has taken two separate actions relating to this
general matter:
First: The government filed its own action in the U.S. District
Court in Jackson, Mississippi, against both Litton Systems, the
contractor, and Litton Industries, which guaranteed performance by
Litton Systems, to obtain an equitable order to compel the continued
performance of the contract without interruption. On August 3, the
District Court issued a preliminary injunction which ordered the
contractor through April 1977 to continue work under the contract
subject to the government advancing funds during such period for
certain costs incurred subsequent to the date of the Court's order.
Second: A motion was filed by the government in the Litton-
initiated action in Los Angeles, asking that court to dismiss Litton's
suit because of lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, asking the
court to transfer the case to the U.S. Court in Jackson, Mississippi.
I understand that this Litton suit has been dismissed.
2
SUBJECT: Litton Shipbuilding Lawsuits (Cont'd)
An action was recently brought in the U.S. District Court in
the District of Columbia by Litton's outside counsel, as an indi-
vidual under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking certain
Navy records. The U.S. District Court for D.C. has ordered the FOIA
suit transferred to the U.S. District in Jackson, MS, in order to
bring the FOIA suit under the judicial control of the court. The
Navy is presently compiling and releasing to Litton's counsel all
documents determined to be producible in connection with the FOIA
suit.
For any further details, I refer you to the Justice Department,
Mr. John Russell, at 739-2017.
BACKGROUND: None
SOURCE: John Russell, Justice Department PA
COORDINATION: Mr. Wiley, General Counsel
September 7, 1976
SUBJECT: Congressional Travel Funds
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on press reports that the Pentagon
is moving to stop its subsidy of foreign travel by Members
of Congress and their staffs which reached an estimated
$600,000 last year?
ANSWER: There is no effort on the part of DoD to restrict Members of
Congress in the performance of their investigation of DoD activities
in the field. However, efforts are underway to more precisely define
the expenditures authorized for an escort officer in support of travel.
We anticipate that this revised definition of authorized expenditures
and accounting procedures will be perceived as being in the best
interest of the American public, the Congress, and the Department of
Defense.
BACKGROUND: None
SOURCE: ASD/LA
COORDINATION: ASD/LA
August 6, 1976
SUBJECT: Kiev Compared with U.S. Aircraft Carriers
QUESTION: How does Kiev compare with U.S. aircraft carriers?
ANSWER: Comparing in size to the Essex-class carriers of World War II,
Kiev is smaller than the newly-commissioned U.S. Navy carrier NIMITZ
(CVN-68). At a length of approximately 900 feet, Kiev displaces less
than 40,000 tons. The NIMITZ is 1,092 feet long with a combat load
displacement of nearly 95,000 tons. The NIMITZ carries three Sea
Sparrow Basic Point Defense Missile System (BPDMS) launchers and
no guns whereas Kiev has a large variety of guns and missiles for
ASW, surface and air defense. Kiev has the capability of loading a
mixture of helicopters and/or V/STOL aircraft totalling about 36
aircraft. In comparison, the newest U.S. carriers carry up to 100
high performance aircraft. The Soviet ship is conventionally steam-
powered and able to attain speeds of over 30 knots. Our nuclear and
conventionally-powered carriers are also capable of speeds in excess
of 30 knots.
BACKGROUND: None
SOURCE: CHINFO
COORDINATION: Donald C. Davis, Acting VCNO
VADM, USN
August 6, 1976
SUBJECT: Hymn #286, "It Was On A Friday Morning"
QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the hymn, "It Was On A Friday
Morning" which has become a controversial issue by some
politicians and church people as being blasphemous?
ANSWER: The Book of Worship for U.S. Forces is a product of four years
labor by many chaplains and respected civilian churchmen. It is clear,
however, that including the hymn, "It Was On A Friday Morning," in the
hymnal was a mistake. As a result, we are conducting a search for a
replacement hymn to appear in subsequent versions of the hymnal. The
search is being conducted by members of the Armed Forces Chaplains
Board, chaired by Chaplain (Major General) Henry J. Meade, USAF. It
has not been determined when another printing of the hymnal will occur.
BACKGROUND: In early 1969, the Armed Forces Chaplains Board appointed
a Hymnal Task Force to review contents of the 1958 Armed Forces Hymnal.
The task force consisted of three Protestant and three Roman Catholic
Chaplains, two each from the Army, Navy and Air Force. In addition,
one Jewish and one Orthodox Chaplain served on the committee to assist
in providing materials for their faith groups. Over 2000 hymns and
tunes were screened. Members of the Hymnal Task Force indicated
singular hymns in this worship book merited special comment. They
stated, "The hymn, 'It Was On A Friday Morning, is the most con-
troversial hymn in the book. Some has said that it is not even a
hymn. Other critics have even denounced it as blasphemous. " Mem-
bers of the task force explained, however, that they recommend its
inclusion in the new hymnal because it deals with real issues and
concerns which many people struggle with in connection with the
crucifixion. It was not included to be blasphemous or to destroy
faith, but to provide a vehicle for dealing deeply and thoughtfully
with the death of Christ, in order to encourage and strengthen faith
in God. Their hope was that this hymn would not just be sung, but
discussed and wrestled with in a constructive manner. They said,
"This hymn cannot be simply sung and dropped. You've got to deal with
it. We recommend you use it as a basis for a Good Friday meditation
"
(continued)
2
SUBJECT: Hymn #286, "It Was On a Friday Morning. "
From time to time revisions and additions are made to our worship
resources. Opinions will be considered in future deliberations per-
taining to worship materials that may be prepared for the Armed Forces.
In January 1975, 558,000 copies of the new hymnal were distributed.
The cost of printing was $1,050,000 or a little less than $2 a copy.
SOURCE: Chaplain A. R. Saeger
(Captain USN-CHC)
Executive Director Chaplains Board
COORDINATION: ASD (M&RA) David Taylor
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
This form marks the file location of item number
6,7
as listed on the pink form (GSA Form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet)
at the front of the folder.