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Eastern Europe - U.S. Policy
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Eastern Europe - U.S. Policy
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John O. Marsh Files (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 13, folder "Eastern Europe - U.S. Policy" of the
John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 13 of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Question: Mr. President, stories appeared in the press recently in
reference to certain statements attributed to Counsellor Sonnenfeldt
concerning a changing view on Administration policy in reference to
Eastern Europe. Does this article reflect your view and if not, what
if your attitude toward the Sonnenfeldt view?
Answer: First, the article does not express my view. I have not
had an opportunity to study the more lengthy views which were contained
in a cable summarizing ematerin remarks of Mr. Sonnenfeldt and, in fact,
I have been advised the article is not even an accurate expression of
his views.
I can assure you, however, of my view in reference to the eastern
nations of Euorpe and that view has not changed. It is also contrary
to the views alleged to be Administration policy in the article.
I am not in favor of any type of political or other domination of
Eastern Europe by the Soviets and so long as I am President that
will not be the policy of this Administration.
FORD i LIBRARY 07V839
As I have said, I have not reviewed all of the materials which have
given rise to this article and inasmuch as I do not have that background,
MATTER
I have directed my advisors to review completely this subject and be
prepared to report to me on this matter more fully when I return to
Washington.
omit Highlighted Camph Sections /
NOT USED
Question: Mr. President, stories appeared in the press recently in
reference to certain statements attributed to Counsellor Sonnenfeldt
concerning a changing view on Administration policy in reference to
Eastern Europe. Does this article reflect your view and if not, what
if your attitude toward the Sonnenfeldt view?
Answer: First, the article does not express my view. I have not
had an opportunity to study the more lengthy views which were contained
in a cable summarizing easterin remarks of Mr. Sonnenfeldt and, in fact,
I have been advised the article is not even an accurate expression of
his views.
I can assure you, however, of my view in reference to the eastern
nations of Euorpe and that view has not changed. It is also contrary
to the views alleged to be Administration policy in the article.
I am not in favor of any type of political or other domination of
Eastern Europe by the Soviets and so long as I am President that
will not be the policy of this Administration.
As I have said, I have not reviewed all of the materials which have
given rise to this article and inasmuch as I do not have that background,
I have directed my advisors to review completely this subject and be
prepared to report to me on this matter more fully when I return to
Washington.
FORD i LIBRARY
U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE
Q:
Mr. President, there have been news reports in recent days
that senior officials of your Administration have urged a policy
of encouraging the Soviet Union to take over Eastern Europe
once and for all because such an "organic union" would lessen
Soviet insecurity in that area and thereby promote stability.
Is this your policy or do these reports presage a change in
Administration policy? Do you support these views?
A:
I have not read the purported statement, but that is not
the issue. The issue is U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe.
Let me state what that policy is. The United States
strongly supports the aspirations for freedom and national
independence of peoples everywhere -- including Eastern Europe.
I have spoken out against attempts of any kind at domination
or the establishment of spheres of influence by any power. That
policy has been made an important part of formal diplomatic
documents.
I have made official visits to several Eastern European
countries and invited Eastern European leaders here in order
to underscore that policy. The policy has not changed. It will
not change. It is a policy we will pursue with patient persistence
and from which we will not be deterred.
My record is clear -- it is a record I am proud of.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
A-7
Q
On another subject, are the demonstrations
in Thailand going to affect the rate of U. S.
withdrawal?
A
No, I do not believe SO. The Thai
have asked us to leave within the next four months,
and we have announced our intention to do so and
to start immediately.
Q Has it started physically?
A
I do not know whether anyone has
physically left as of Saturday, but it is just a question
of time. There is no question on any delay. They
will move as soon as it is possible to start moving.
Q Is there any question of negotiations
being reopened if a new government is appointed?
A
Not as far as I know.
BEGIN
Q
On another matter, a column by Evans
and Novak this morning quotes Mr. Sonnenfeldt out
of a meeting in December. Can we have the full record
of those statements so that we can examine the context
of them?
A
No. I do not believe you can have a
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
A-8
full record of the comments. The columnists are
referring to classified discussions that took
place in London at the annual Chiefs of
Mission Meeting -- that is, Ambassadors from European
countries with the Secretary and other senior
officials. So we are not able to provide a record
of that.
Q
Well then, are the quotations accurate?
A
We are just not going to get into
the business of commenting on reports which claim to
be based on leaked documents. But I will say, Murrey,
that the policy described in that column is not the
policy of the United States toward Eastern Europe ---
Q
Was it what Mr. Sonnenfeldt said?
A
There have been no statements made
by Administration officials, either privately or publicly
--
Q
Go slower, Bob.
A
-- actual or imputed -- that change our
policy. We do not accept the domination of Eastern
Europe by anybody. You recall that President Ford made
VORC
LIBRARY
A-9
two visits to Eastern Europe with the Secretary of
State. The Secretary made another visit himself.
These visits demonstrate that we want friendly relations
with the countries of Eastern Europe --
Q
You're not helping us --
A
This has been a longstanding
policy.
Q
You're not helping us much here
because the column alleges that what Mr. Sonnenfeldt
said was not consistent with U. S. policy.
You are telling us that U. S. policy hasn't changed,
so you're not really dealing with the thrust of the
column at all.
A
I do not agree with you, Murrey.
I think the thrust of the column was suggesting that in
some way the United States was acquiescing in the
domination of Eastern Europe. I said categorically
we do not accept the domination of Eastern Europe by
anybody.
Q
No. The thrust of the column was,
GERALO FORD LIBRAST
I believe, if you will re-read it -- it was quoting
Mr. Sonnenfeldt, and it was raising a question of
whether the views that were attributed to him were
consistent with U. S. policy. And that's the question
A-10
I'm asking you.
A
I said that the policy described in
that column is not the policy of the United States
toward Eastern Europe.
Q I know.
A
And I said there have been no statements
by Administration officials -- and that includes Mr.
Sonnenfeldt -- either public or private, actual or
imputed, to change that policy.
Q
Is that another way of saying that he
was misquoted in that column?
A
I think I will leave it the way I
stated it.
Q
Are you repudiating what's said in the
column? I think you are.
A Yes.
2
But the column did not refer to
domination of Eastern Europe. It spoke of an organic
union.
Now, that's not domination.
A
I am not going to go through the
GERALB FORD LIBRARY
column sentence by sentence, but I think there
was a thrust to the column. And I think I have stated
A-11
very clearly what our position is on the column.
Q
I don't want to ask you to keep repeating
what you've said, except to point out that you have not
given us any comment on either side of whether the
quotations attributed to the speaker are accurate
quotations.
A
As I said at the beginning, Murrey,
I am not going to go into a line-by-line discussion
of that column.
Q
That's not what I'm asking you for.
I asked you if the quotations were accurate or not.
A
The policy described in the column,
either in quotes or out of quotes, is not the policy
of the United States towards Eastern Europe.
Q
Bob, you said --
Q
Is this the first time --
Q
-- this is the first time a statement by
a State Department officer has ever been made to that effect?
Q
Does that cover the remarks that Sonnenfeldt
might have made at London?
A
Yes. I said including Mr. Sonnenfeldt.
Q
At London in that meeting?
GERALD FORD BIBRIDA
A-12
Q
Any place.
Q
Or even repudiating --
Q
Wait a minute.
[Cont'd on pg. B-1.]
FORDO : LIBRARY
B-1
I
Are you reputing what Mr. Sonnenfeldt
said, or are you reputing the column's interpretation
of what he said?
I
What you actually said, Bob, as I
understand it, is there have been no statements by
Administration officials, either privately or publicly,
that change our policy.
Do you mean that to say that Sonnenfeldt did
not suggest any change in the policy?
A
I am not suggesting that he suggested any change.
C
How about Ozzie's question?
Q
I asked whether you were reputing the
column's interpretation of what Sonnenfeldt said or if
you were repudiating what he said.
A
I do not think I want to get into that sort
of a detailed discussion of this column, because in
general I am saying that the policy described is not
the policy of the United States; and I have said that
there has been nothing said by Administration officials
that suggests any change in our policy.
I
Is this the first time in your knowledge
that this policy described in this article has been
repudiated?
GERALD FORD LIBRART
B-2
A
I think it has
been consistent U.S. policy that we do not accept the
domination or hegemony of anybody in Eastern Europe.
And I think the whole thrust of our policy with Eastern
Europe supports that.
I
But what you are repudiating is your
interpretation of that column; namely, that the United
States is acquiescing -- you say the domination
of Eastern Europe; whereas, I believe the general
interpretation of that column is different, that there is
talk there of accepting an organic union between Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, which is really quite
different from accepting domination. Now, are you
repudiating that too?
A
I am not going to go beyond what I have
said. I am not going to get drawn into commenting on the
column in its detail of what is in quotation marks or what
isn't in quotation marks--how one person may interpret
or how another person interprets. I think from what I
have said there is a clear understanding of how we stand
on the general outline of the column.
Q
Was Sonnenfeldt in this case reprimanded
GERALD ? FORD
B-3
or repudiated for these views?
A
Why? In the first place, you are
assuming that it is an accurate account of his views.
Q
Has Mr. Sonnenfeldt said whether or not
it is an accurate account? The quotes themselves.
A
I consulted with Mr. Sonnenfeldt in
preparing my briefing this morning.
Q
And he said the quotes were not accurate?
A
I said I was not going to get into commenting
on whether quotes that purport to be based on leaked
documents are accurate or inaccurate.
2
Bob, in the past when it serves your
purposes you do not shrink from saying that a quoted
statement, leaked or not, is accurate or inaccurate or
taken out of context. Why are you shrinking from doing
so now?
A
I do not think I have.
Q
You say you have repudiated it.
A
I think if you look back over your notes --
Q
Going back to what Ozzie said, you didn't
have any difficulty attacking a column by Safire on the
Secretary and the Kurds in which you characterized the
whole column, which included a quote as I recall, as
LIBRARY GERALD FORD
B-4
being a distortion, and so forth.
A
I do not recall commenting on a specific
quoted sentence. But rather I think in general we
comment on the general thrust of a column, and in
particular, one that purports to be based on leaked
documents.
Q
Bob, would you accept that the thrust of
this column is that we should acquiesce in even more
domination than already exists, in which we already do
acquiesce?
A
I think you will have to ask Mr. Evans and Mr.
Novak for the interpretation of what they mean by what
they have written.
Q
Can we get it straight whether you are
repudiating (a) the column, or/and (b) Sonnenfeldt?
A
Well, (b) we are not in any way
repudiating Mr. Sonnenfeldt. There is
nothing I have said today that should suggest that.
And (a), yes we are repudiating the column. And I
think it is clear from everything I have said about it. end
I
On another subject, Bob, we have been
given to understand that the Secretary was intending
to travel to Moscow probably in mid-March as the next
SERALD FORD LIBRAST
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1
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74
By WHM , NARA, Date 11/28/00
SECRET
R 012139Z Feb 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
To All European Diplomatic Posts
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
SECRET State 024976
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
EXDIS For Ambassador
By WHM , NARA, Date 11/28/00
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS:
ECON, PFOR
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward USSR and Eastern Europe
1.
Following is a non-verbatim summary of the Counselor's
discussion of this subject to the EUR Chiefs of Mission Meeting in
London in mid-December. It is intended for your background
guidance and that of your senior staff and is not. to be used directly
in your talks with host government.
2.
Begin summary. We are witnessing the emergence of the
Soviet Union as a super power on a global scale. This will be a long-
term process. It is a process that is just beginning in global terms as
the Soviets are just now breaking out of their continental mold. They
are just now developing modalities for carrying out such a global policy.
3.
The reason why it is possible for the United States and its
Western European Allies to develop the policies that will allow us to cope
with this situation is that Soviet power is developing irregularly. It
is subject to flaws and to requirements which in some cases only the outside
world can meet.
4.
Their thrust as an imperial power comes at a time well after that
period when the last imperial power, Germany, made the plunge, and it
hence comes at a time when different rules and perceptions apply. The
Soviets have been inept. They have not been able to bring the attractions
that past imperial powers brought to their conquests. They have not
brought the ideological, legal, cultural, architectural, organizational
and other values and skills that characterized the British, French and
German adventures.
5.
In addition, there are serious underlying pressures and tensions
in the Soviet system itself. The base from which imperialism asserts
itself has serious problems in the economic and social sectors. There
are also internal nationalist groups which are growing. Non-Russian
nationalist groups in Russia are growing at a disproportionally faster rate,
which will add to these tensions in the base whence springs Soviet
imperialism.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SEGRET
- 2 -
6.
The Soviets have been particularly unskilled in building viable
international structures. They have nothing approaching the European
Community or the many other successful Western institutions. In Eastern
Europe particularly, the single most important unifying force is the
presence of sheer Soviet military power. There has been no development
of a more viable, organic structure. If anything, the last thirty years have
intensified the urges in Eastern European countries for autonomy, for
identity. There has been an intensification of the desire to break out
of the Soviet straitjacket. This has happened in every Eastern European
country to one degree or another. There are almost no genuine friends
of the Soviets left in Eastern Europe, except possibily Bulgaria.
7.
The Soviets' inability to acquire loyalty in Eastern Europe is
+
an unfortunate historical failure because Eastern Europe is within their scope
and area of natural interest. It is doubly tragic that in this area of vital
interest and crucial importance it has not been possible for the Soviet
Union to establish roots of interest that go beyond sheer power.
8.
It is, therefore, important to remember that the main, if not the
only, instrument of Soviet imperialism has been power.
9.
The reason we can today talk and think in terms of dealing with
Soviet imperialism, outside of and in addition to simple confrontation, is
precisely because Soviet power is emerging in such a flawed way.
This gives us the time to develop and to react. There is no way to
prevent the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower. What we
can d is affect the way in which that power is developed and used. Not
only can we balance it in the traditional sense but we can affect its
usage -- and that is what detente is all about.
10.
It is often asked how detente is doing. The question itself
evades the central issue we are trying to pose. That is, what do you do
in the face of increasing Soviet power? We will be facing this increased
power if our relationship with the Russians is sweet or our relationship
with the Russians is sour. The day whe n the U.S. could choose its
preferences from two alternatives is over: that is, turning our back on the world
usually behind the protection of another power like the British Navy - or
changing the world. That choice no longer exists for us. There is too much
power in the world for us to ignore, not just the Soviets, but other industrial
powers, raw material producers, and even the combined political power
of the dwarf states. Nor do we today have enough power to simply over-
whelm these problems.
SECRET
SEGRET
SECRET
SECRET
- 3 -
11.
So the Soviets will be seen and heard on the world stage no
matter what we do. Therefore, the question of whether or not detente is
up or down at a particular moment is largely irrelevant. We Americans
like to keep score cards. But the historic challenge of the Soviet Union
will not go away and the problem of coping with the effects of that growing
Soviet power also won't go away. We don't have any alternative except to
come to grips with the various forms of power which surround us in the
world. We have to get away from seeing detente as a process which
appeases or propitiates Soviet power. We have to see our task as managing
or domesticating this power. That is our central problem in the years
ahead, not finding agreements to sign or atmospheres to improve, although
those have some effect. Our challenge is how to live in a world with another
super power, and anticipate the arrival of a third super power, China, in
twenty years or so.
12.
The debate in the United States on detente is illustrated by comments
that Soviet trade is a one-way street. It seems that today you can t just get payme
for the goods you sell -- you must get Jewish emigration, or arms restraint,
or any number of other things.
13.
Our European friends have extended considerable credit to the
Soviets and Eastern European countries, while the US does not extend
lines of credit but rather approves financing on the basis of each project.
That feature gives us some control over the direction of Soviet economic
development. The Europeans have surrendered on this point. While not
"
falling into the trade trap, we have seen trade as a set of instrumentalities
to address the set of problems we face with the Soviets. We have to
find a way to develop a coherent trade strategy that goes beyond the
commercial views of individual firms.
14.
The grain agreement is a good but narrow example of what I am
talking about. The Soviets were forced to accept that they need substantial
imports from the United States. That gives us leverage, but only if it is
done within a coherent framework of policies to achieve certain objectives.
MFN has been considered a concession to the USSR, and in a sense it is.
The Soviets don't like paying interest -- they prefer to earn their way as
they go. If this is an accurate assessment, then with MFN and credit
policies we can get the USSR to be competitively engaged in our US markets.
If done skillfully, this forces them to meet the requirements of the sophisti-
cated US market. MFN entry into US markets can have an mpact on Soviet
behavior. This is not a trivial matter.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
15.
It is in our long-term interests to use these strengths to break
down the autarkic nature of the USSR. There are consumer choices
being made in the USSR that, although more below the surface than
those in the United States, can be exploited. This is just one illustration.
There are many assets in the West in this area and instead of looking at
them as just commercial sales, we need to be using them to draw
the Soviet Union into a series of dependencies and ties with the West. It is
a long-term project.
16.
When we lost the MFN battle with Congress, we lost our ability
to impose a degree of discipline on the Soviet Union as we were able to do
in the case of the grain deal. This is the real tragedy of losing that trade
issue. In the long-term, we have suffered a setback.
17.
With regard to Eastern Europe, it must be in our long-term
interest to influence events in this area because of the present unnatural
relationship with the Soviet Union so that they will not sooner or later
explode, causing WW III. This inorganic, unnatural relationship is a far
greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West.
There is one qualification to this statement. If Western Europe becomes
so concerned with its economic and social problems that an imbalance
develops, then perhaps the dangers to the United States' interests will be
endangered by the simple change in the balance of power.
18.
So, it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the
relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an
organic one. Any excess of zeal on our part is bound to produce results that
could reverse the desired process for a period of time, even though the
process would remain inevitable within the next 100 years. But, of course,
for us that is too long a time to wait.
19.
So, our policy must be a policy of responding to the clearly visible
aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within
the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence, This has worked in
Poland. The Poles have been able to overcome their romantic political
inclinations which led to their disasters in the past. They have been skillful in
developing a policy that is satisfying their needs for a national identity with-
out arousing Soviet reactions. It is a long process.
20.
A similar process is now going on in Hungary. Janos Kadar's
performance has been remarkable in finding ways which are acceptable
to the Soviet Union which develop Hungarian roots and the natural aspirations
of the people. He has conducted a number of experiments in the social and
economic areas. To a large degree he has been able to do this because the
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
- 5 -
Soviets have four divisions in Hungary and, therefore, have not
been overly concerned. He has skillfully used their presence as a security
blanket for the Soviets, in a way that has been advantageous to the develop-
ment of his own country.
21.
The Romanian picture is different as one would expect from their
different history. The Romanians have striven for autonomy but they have
been less daring and innovative in their domestic systems. They remain
among the most rigid countries in the internal organization of their system.
22.
We seek to influence the emergence of the Soviet imperial power
by making the base more natural and organic so that it will not remain
founded in sheer power alone. But there is no alternative open to us other
than that of influencing the way Soviet power is used.
23.
Finally, on Yugoslavia. We and the Western Europeans, indeed
the Eastern Europeans as well, have an interest which borders on the vital
for us in continuing the independence of Yugoslovia from Soviet domination.
Of course we accept that Yugoslav behavior will continue to be, as it has
been in the past, influenced and constrained by Soviet power, but any shift
back by Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit would represent a major strategic
set-back for the West. So we are concerned about what will happen when
Tito disappears, and it is worrying us a good deal.
24.
So our basic policy continues to be that which we have pursued
since 1948-49, keeping Yugoslavia in a position of substantial independence
from the Soviet Union. Now at the same time we would like them to be
less obnoxious, and we should allo v them to get away with very little.
We should especially disabuse them of any notion that our interest in their
relative incependence is greater than their own and, therefore, they have
a free ride. End summary.
SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
LYQBZCZCWHE014
'''''ZZ WTE16
RECEIVED
26-1016AM
DE WTE 1566 0861804
Z 261811Z MAR 76
FM JACK MARSH
TO DICK CHENEY ABOARD AF-1
SAN FRANCISCO COMM CENTER FOR DICK CHENEY
ZEM
CONFIDENTIALWH60420
MARCH 26,1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY
FROM:
JACK MARSH
IN REFERENCE TO SUBJECT WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING, I ADD THE
FOLLOWING:
--MYRON KUROPAS, BAROODY'S SHOP, REPORTS THE ETHNIC GROUP
OF THE NATONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS REPRODUCED AND MAILED
THE EVANS-NOVAK COLUMN TO ETHNIC LEADERS AND ETHNIC PRESS.
THIS IS TO TIE IN WITH A MEETING OF ETHNIC LEADERS WITH THE
DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE THIS WEEKEND TO DISCUSS PLATFORM ISSUES.
--JERRY HAS TALKED WITH BRYCE WHO ADVISES;
1. THIS CAN BE A MAJOR ISSUE AND POSSIBLY ACCELERATE
WITHIN THE NEXT 12 HOURS.
2. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT BRING IT UP ON HIS OWN
BUT SHOULD RESPOND TO A QUESTION.
3. STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD COME OUT HARD, FAST AND
KNOCK DOWN THE WASHINGTON POST STORY AS BEING
INACCURATE AND CONTRARY TO UNITED STATES POLICY.
0183
1566
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
NNNN
Determined E.O. 12356 16,16,1983
to be an 12356,Sective 1983
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Archivist's Cancelled per memo of 16,
By DAD NAR date 1/9/86
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 26, 1976
FOR:
Jack Marsh
FROM:
Myron B. Kuropas
THRU:
53
William J. Baroody, Jr.
SUBJECT:
The Evans-Novak Article of March 22: A Damage
Survey and Recommendations
As you are aware, the Evans and Novak article which appeared in
the Washington Post on March 22 wherein State Department coun-
selor Helmut Sonnenfeldt is alleged to have argued on behalf of an
"organic union" in Eastern Europe, caused a furor in a number of
ethnic communities. I have heard directly from Latvian, Czecho-
slovak, Hungarian, and Lithuanian leaders and it is my under-
standing that an ethnic meeting of representatives of the Czecho-
slovak National Council, the Coordinating Committee of Hungarian
Organizations in North America and the Joint Baltic American
Committee met last night to discuss the article and to plan a
strategy to voice their protests.
In addition:
1) Andrew Valuchek, Special Assistant to the Chairman for Ethnic
Affairs, mailed the article to his ethnic contacts for discussion
in Providence, Rhode Island this weekend when the Democratic
Platform Committee will be in session to develop, among other
things, their ethnic posture.
2) Congressman Edward Derwinski, Chairman of the Republican
Heritage Groups Council, met with the Secretary of State on
Thursday. The Congressman was most unhappy with Dr.
Kissinger's responses.
FOR:
Jack Marsh
Page 2
3) Mr. Aloysius Mazewski, President of the Polish National
Alliance of the U.S.A, has sent a letter to President Ford
condemning the Sonnenfeldt position. Other letters can be
expected from the Hungarians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Es-
tonians, and Ukrainians.
4) The Joint Baltic American Committee condemned the
position in a letter to me dated March 26. (See attachment).
In my view, Administration efforts to assuage the Eastern
European ethnic leadership after Helsinki (see attached letter
to Estonians as example) have been undermined by the Sonnen-
feldt position which has also resulted in certain international
implications. (See attached Washington Post article.)
The Administration, it seems, needs to take immediate steps
to stem what could be a growing tide of resentment.
Our recommendations are as follows:
1) The President discuss the Sonnenfeldt position and disavow
it as totally non-representative of American foreign policy.
The stronger the form of the disavowal, the better.
2) The President meet with Leonid Pliusch, a Soviet dissident,
when he comes to Washington to testify vefore the Congressional
Subcommittee.
3) Consideration be given to the President giving his support
to H.R. 9466, a bill which would establish a Commission to
monitor the Helsinki Agreement.
THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE
POST OFFICE BOX 432
ROCKVILLE. MARYLAND 20850
U. S. A.
THE ESTONIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL
TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 301
THE AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION
340-1954
IN THE UNITED STATES. INC.
THE LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL. INC.
March 26, 1976
Dr. Myron Kuropas
Special Assistant to the President
for Ethnic Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C., 20500
Dear Dr. Kuropas,
Enclosed you will find a copy of the Evans-Novak article "A Soviet-East
European Organic Union," which appeared March 22nd, 1976, in the Washington Post.
We were shocked to read that a high administration official such as State Depai
ment Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt feels that United States policy must "strive for an
evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Unit
an organic one."
The Joint Baltic American Committee would be most appreciative, if you would 1c
into these remarks attributed to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, and clarify this entire unfortunate
disclosure by columnist Robert Novak.
We would like to know, whether Mr. Sonnenfeldt, in fact, made the remarks at-
tributed to him, and whether theee remarks represent his own personal views, or represe
a new official United States policy toward the Eastern European governments.
We would also appreciate a clarification of whether Mr. Sonnenfeldt's briefing
to the United States ambassadors of European nations was, in fact, a directive to im-
plement the policy of "Soviet-East European Organic Union."
Dr. Kuropas, it is very disturbing to the Baltic-American communities in the
United States to read these types of articles attributed to "high government officials
To clear up this matter, and to alleviate the fears of the thousands of American citize
whi read this article, we hope your response is prompt and reassuring that Mr. Sonnen-
feldt's doctrine is not the policy of the United States.
Gunars Meierovics, Chairman
John John E. E Genys, Genes Ph.D.
Joint Baltic American Committee
Lithuanian American Council, Inc.
Edward J. Sumanas
Maido Kari
Public Relations Director
Estonian American National Council
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 19, 1976
TO AMERICANS OF ESTONIAN ANCESTRY:
I am delighted to accept the high honor of Honorary
Patron of ESTO '76 -- The Estonian Salute to
America's Bicentennial.
As we celebrate the birth of freedom in America,
your Estonian Festival calls attention to the remark-
able contributions of millions of talented and hard-
working immigrants from all over the world to building
America into the great nation we know today.
In recalling the fortitude of our founding fathers, we
must also rededicate ourselves to making America
the same stronghold for men and women of individual
spirit and energy it was in 1776 -- the cradle of
liberty.
I am keenly aware of your great anxiety concerning
your homeland, families and friends who have been
and are still profoundly affected by East - West poli-
tical developments in Europe. Last summer, just
before departing for Helsinki, and before that in
February of 1975, I met with your leaders to discuss
these concerns and to emphasize that the accord I
would sign in Helsinki was neither a treaty nor a legally
binding document.
- 2 -
The Helsinki agreements, I pointed out, were political
and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions
and opening further the lines of communication between
the peoples of East and West.
I further stated that your understandable concern about
the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic
nations was groundless.
I can assure you that the United States has never recog-
nized the Soviet incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania and is not doing so now. Our official policy
of nonrecognition is not affected by the results of the
European Security Conference.
It is the policy of the United States -- and it has been
my policy ever since I entered public life -- to support
the aspirations for freedom and national independence
of the peoples of Eastern Europe by every proper and
peaceful means.
Finally, I indicated that there is included in the Declara-
tion of Principles on Territorial Integrity the provision
that no occupation or acquisition of territory in violation
of international law will be recognized as legal.
In our White House meeting, I said this is not to raise
the hope that there will be any immediate change in the
map of Europe, but rather to emphasize that the United
States has not abandoned and will not compromise this
long-standing principle.
At the conference itself, I told the participants from the
countries of the East that:
"We will spare no effort to ease tensions and to solve
problems between us, but it is important that you recog-
nize the deep devotion of the American people and their
government to human rights and fundamental freedoms."
- 3 -
I assure each of you that this nation will be vigilant
regarding detente. This nation will strive to maintain
a safer and saner relationship with our competitors.
At the same time, the relaxation of tensions can be
implemented only on the basis of mutual concessions
within the context of an American defense that is second
to none. We will safeguard and advance our vital interests
and security.
As we commemorate the 200th anniversary of our revolu-
tion, more and more Americans are mindful of their bi-
national heritage. In this regard, I was especially pleased
to learn that your community is preparing for a worldwide
Estonian Festival in conjunction with our Bicentennial.
Your contributions to this nation are recognized and
appreciated. I know you will continue to enrich our
country's heritage with your art, your architecture,
your music and the individual contributions of your many
talented individuals.
I commend you for your continued contributions to our
national legacy, to our durable system of representative
government. Today, I salute you for your struggle on
behalf of all human freedom.
Herold R. Ford
Some items in this folder were not digitized because it contains copyrighted
materials. Please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for access to
these materials.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 26, 1976
FOR:
Jack Marsh Joh
FROM:
Myron B. Miropas
B
THRU:
William J. Baroody, Jr.
SUBJECT: The Evans-Novak Article of March 22: A Damage
Survey and Recomumendations
As you are aware, the Evans and Novak article which appeared in
the Washington Post on March 22 wherein State Department coun-
selor Helmut Sonnenfeldt is alleged to have argued on behalf of an
"organic union" in Eastern Europe, caused a furor in a number of
ethnic communities. have heard directly from Latvian, Csecho-
alovak, Hungarian, and Lithnanian leaders and it is my under-
standing that an ethnic meeting of representatives of the Czecho-
slovak National Council, the Coordinating Committee of Hungarian
Organizations in North America and the Joint Baltic American
Committee met last night to discuss the article and to plan #
strategy to voice their protests.
In addition:
1) Andrew Valuchek, Special Assistant to the Chairman for Ethnic
Affairs, mailed the article to his ethnic contacts for discussion
in Providence, Rhode Island this weekend when the Democratic
Platform Committee will be in session to develop, among other
things, their ethnic posture.
2) Congressman Edward Derwinski, Chairman of the Republican
Heritage Groups Council, met with the Secretary of State on.
Thursday. The Congressman was most unhappy with Dr.
Kissinger's responses.
FOR:
Jack Marsh
Page 2
3) Mr. Aloysins Masewski, President of the Polish National
Alliance of the U.S.A, has sent a letter to President Ford
condemming the Somenfeldt position. Other letters can be
expected from the Hungarians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Es-
tonians, and Ukrainians.
4) The Joint Baltic American Committee condemned the
position in a letter to me dated March 26. (See attachment).
In my view, Administration efforts to assuage the Eastern
European ethnic leadership after Helsinki (see attached letter
to Estonians as example) have been undermined by the Sonnen-
feldt position which has also resulted in certain international
implications.(See attached Washington Post article.)
The Administration, it seems, needs to take immediate steps
to stem what could be a growing tide of resentment.
Our recommendations are as follows:
1) The President discuss the Sonnenfeldt position and disavow
it as totally non-representative of American foreign policy.
The stronger the form of the disavowal, the better.
2) The President meet with Leonid Pliusch, a Soviet dissident,
when he comes to Washington to testify vefore the Congressional
Subcommittee.
3) Consideration be given to the President giving his support
to H.R. 9466, a bill which would establish a Commission to
monitor the Helsinki Agreement.
!
THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE
POST OFFICE BOX 432
ROCKVILLE. MARYLAND zoeso
U. $. A.
IMI ESTONIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL
TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 301
THE AMERICAN LATVIAR ASSOCIATION
240-1994
RN THE UNITED STATES. INC.
THE LITHUANAN AMERICAN COUNCIL. INC.
March 26, 1976
Dr. Myron Europas
Special Assistant to the President
for Ethnic Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C., 20500
Dear Dr. Europas,
Enclosed you will find & copy of the Evans-Novak article "A Soviet-East
European Organic Union," which appeared March 22nd, 1976, in the Washington Post.
Be were shocked to read that a high administration official such as State Depar
ment Counselor Melmut Somenfeldt feels that United States policy must "strive for an
evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Unis
an organic one."
The Joint Baltic American Committee would be most appreciative, if you would Ic
into these remarks attributed to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, and clarify this entire unfortunate
disclosure by columnist Robert novak.
We would like to know, whether Mr. Sonnenfeldt, in fact, made the remarks at-
tributed to him, and whether these remarks represent his our personal views, or represe
a new official United States policy toward the Eastern European governments,
We would also appreciate a clarification of whether Mr. Somenfeldt's briefing
to the United States ambassadors of European nations was, in fact, a directive to in
plement the policy of "Soviet-East European Organic Union."
Dr. Kuropas, it is very disturbing to the Baltic-Americam comunities -in the
United States to read these tubes of articles attributed to "high government officials.
To clear up this matter, and to alleviate the fears of the thousands of American citize
whi read this article, we hope your response is prompt and reassuring that Mr. Somen-
feldt's doctrine is not the policy of the United States.
JohnE Genes
Guars Neierovics, Chairman
John E. Genys, PhvD.
Coint Baltic American Committee
Lithuanian American Council, Inc.
Edward J Annonan
Edward J. Stemanas
Raido Kari
Public Relations Director
Estonian American National Council
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 19, 1976
TO AMERICANS OF ESTONIAN ANCESTRY:
I am delighted to accept the high bonor of Honorary
Patron of ESTO '76 -- The Estonian Salute to
America's Bicentennial.
As we celebrate the birth of freedom in America,
your Estonian Festival calls attention to the remark-
able contributions of millions of talented and hard-
working immigrants from all over the world to building
America into the great nation we know today.
In recalling the fortitude of our founding fathers, we
must also rededicate ourselves to making America
the same stronghold for men and women of individual
spirit and energy it was in 1776 -- the cradle of
liberty.
I am keenly aware of your great anxiety concerning
your homeland, families and friends who have been
and are still profoundly affected by East - West poli-
tical developments in Europe. Last summer, just
before departing for Helsinki, and before that in
February of 1975, I met with your leaders to discuss
these concerns and to emphasize that the accord I
would sign in Helsinki was neither a treaty nor a legally
binding document.
- Z -
The Helsinki agreements, I pointed out, were political
and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions
and opening further the lines of communication between
the peoples of East and West.
I further stated that your understandable concern about
the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic
nations was groundless.
I can assure you that the United States has never recog-
nized the Soviet incorporation of Estonia, Latyia and
Lithuania and is not doing so now. Our official policy
of nonrecognition is not affected by the results of the
European Security Conference.
It is the policy of the United States -- and it has been
my policy ever since I entered public life -- to support
the aspirations for freedom and national independence
of the peoples of Eastern Europe by every proper and
peaceful means.
Finally, I indicated that there is included in the Declara-
tion of Principles on Territorial Integrity the provision
that no occupation or acquisition of territory in violation
of international law will be recognised as legal.
In our White House meeting, I said this is not to raise
the hope that there will be any immediate change in the
map of Europe, but rather to emphasize that the United
States has not abandoned and will not compromise this
long-standing principle.
At the conference itself, 1 told the participants from the
countries of the East that:
"We will spare no effort to ease tensions and to solve
problems between us, but it is important that you recog-
nize the deep devotion of the American people and their
government to human rights and fundamental freedoms."
- 3 -
I assure each of you that this nation will be vigilant
regarding detente. This nation will strive to maintain
2 safer and saner relationship with our competitors.
At the same time, the relaxation of tensions can be
implemented only on the basis of mutual concessions
within the context of an American defense that is second
to none. We will safeguard and advance our vital interests
and security.
As we commemorate the 200th anniversary of our revolu-
tion, more and more Americans are mindful of their bi-
national heritage. In this regard, I was especially pleased
to learn that your community is preparing for a worldwide
Estonian Festival in conjunction with our Bicentennial.
Your contributions to this nation are recognized and
appreciated. I know you will continue to enrich our
country's heritage with your art, your architecture,
your music and the individual contributions of your many
talented individuals.
I commead you for your continued contributions to our
national legacy, to our durable system of representative
government. Today, I salute you for your struggle on
behalf of all human freedom.
Harold R. Ford
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TO DICK CHENEY ABD AF-1
SAN FRANCISCO COMMCENTER FOR DICK CHENEY
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UNCLAS WH60419
U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE
Q: MR. PRESIDENT, THERE HAVE BEEN NEWS REPORTS IN RECENT DAYS
THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION HAVE URGED A POLICY
OF ENCOURAGING THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE OVER EASTERN EUROPE
ONCE AND FOR ALL BECAUSE SUCH AN "ORGANIC UNION" WOULD LESSEN
SOVIET INSECURITY IN THAT AREA AND THEREBY PROMOTE STABILITY.
IS THIS YOUR POLICY OR DO THESE REPORTS PRESAGE A CHANGE IN
ADMINISTRATION POLICY? DO YOU SUPPORT THESE VIEWS?
A: I HAVE NOT READ THE PURPORTED STATEMENT, BUT THAT IS NOT
THE ISSUE.
LET ME STATE WHAT MY POLICY IS. FIRST, THE ARTICLE CLEARLY DOES
NOT EXPRESS MY VIEW. IN FACT, I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THE ARTICLE
IS VERY INACCURATE.
I CAN ASSURE YOU OF MY VIEW OF EASTERN EUROPE. THAT VIEW HAS
NOT CHANGED, AND IT IS ALSO CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS ALLEGED TO-BE
ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN THE ARTICLE. THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY
SUPPORTS THE ASPIRATIONS FOR FREEDOM AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
OF PEOPLES EVERYWHERE -- INCLUING EASTERN EUROPE.
I AM TOTALLY OPPOED TO SPHERES OF INFLUENCE BY ANY POWER AND
so LONG AS I AM PRESIDENT THIS WILL BE THE POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS POLICY A PART OF FORMAL
WRITTEN DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS.
I HAVE MADE OFFICIAL VISITS TO EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND
INVITED EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS HERE TO UNDERSCORE THAT POLICY.
IT IS A POLICY WE WILL PURSUE WITH PATIENT PERSISTENCE AND FROM
WHICH WE WILL NOT WAIVER.
MY RECORD IS CLEAR -- IT IS A RECORD I AM PROUD OF.
Q: WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT SONNENFELDT?
A8 I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT WHAT HAS BEEN REPORTED REPRESENTS MR.
SONNENFELDT'S VIEWS. I HAVE ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO
FIND OUT THE TRUE FACTS.
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