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December 28, 1973 - Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer
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1552648
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December 28, 1973 - Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Portugal
Spain
Israel
Saudi Arabia
Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory)
Iran
Cape Verde
Vietnam (Democratic Republic)
Arms transfers
Foreign aid
Middle East conflicts
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Petroleum
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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1973-12-28
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1973
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28
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1973-12-28
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12
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1973
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 010683
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME
Kissinger/Schlesinger/Colby/Moorer/Scowcr
CREATION DATE
12/28/1973
VOLUME
7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
036600064
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEORANDA OF
CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER
3
FOLDER TITLE
December 28, 1973 - Kissinger,
Schlesinger
DATE WITHDRAWN
01/31/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
SANITIZED 9/29/03
7/8/10
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
FOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Friday, December 28, 1973
1:16 - 2:45 p.m. (lunch)
PLACE:
The Map Room
DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted
The White House
AUTHORITY MR appeal 01-10t;45 NARA7/8/10
BY dal NARA, DATE 8/31/10
[Cable on the Oriskany. ]
Kissinger: I didn't say that.
Schlesinger: I know, but it must be corrected. How about the Bainbridge?
Kissinger: It is a good idea to vary it.
Schlesinger: Good. The Bainbridge is near Malacca now.
Kissinger: Can we let Moynihan know so he stays off my back?
GERALD
Schlesinger: How come Madagascar cut us off from fishing?
Colby: They were flexing their muscles.
Moorer: They didn't want to part company with the rest of Africa.
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)
,AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
TOP SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
2.
Kissinger: Kenya let us in.
Colby: He is tougher.
Schlesinger: On the Indian Ocean, we should move on Diego Garcia.
Moorer: The package is on its way to State.
Schlesinger: I told Sykes that we are not going to provide things free
and then get nitpicked on Diego.
Kissinger: We sent a scorching letter to Faisal and Sadat and will
send one to the Shah. We have said our ability to proceed in the peace
talks depends on an end to the embargo.
Moorer: Two can play this. Maybe we should raise the price of our stuff
to the Shah.
Schlesinger: We are. I am thinking of charging him 1.9 for the F - 15 R&D.
Colby: The oil increase to us is $10 billion.
Kissinger: Akins is tough. He told Yamani that the Saudis are the ogres
of the civilized world.
EO 12958
3.3(b)(1)(6)
Kissinger: A production increase helps more than getting the embargo
lifted, but it is a political issue.
Colby: I think we must teach them a lesson.
GERALD
TERRY
Kissinger: Then we should hold up on the peace talks.
All: Yes. Refuse to pressure the Israelis.
Kissinger: I will show you the one kilometer withdrawal Dayan offered.
That was the source of the story about me. He is coming here next week.
I am agreeing in principle. [Discussed the zones of withdrawal. But
they can't separate the essential from the trivial. The key is can Egypt
launch an attack across Sinai without mobilizing? We can't tie the embargo
to progress in the talks.
TOP-SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
3.
Schlesinger: The embargo is not really hurting us. We haven't touched
our reserves. Our marginal wells will start producing.
Colby: This is a blessing in disguise, In 1980, this would be a disaster.
Moorer: Tell us about Le Duc Tho and Portugal.
Kissinger: On Le Duc Tho, I think it's 60-40 against an offensive. He
wanted a cease fire, delimitation of zones, release of civilian prisoners,
and economic aid.
I could get lots if we could get aid through Congress. Could we?
Schlesinger: Yes. The tenor of the Hill has changed. Also the economy
is going sour.
Kissinger: On a cease fire, they want another announcement. We said
no unless there is demarcation prior to it.
He has now accepted the GVN 5,000 prisoner total. He dropped his
political demands. All he wants is the third Vietnam which he already has.
I told him I would send him a message in January and maybe we'd meet
again -- but we wouldn't tolerate any nonsense. I think he is scared and
we should put everything we can into the GVN. How about that boat?
Moorer: We don't have the money to do what they want and more is beyond
the capacity of GVN.
Schlesinger: We got 1.26
Colby: Getting a few bucks for North Vietnam is easier than a lot of bucks
for the GVN.
Moorer:
GERALD
LIBRARY
Kissinger:
Eo 12958
Moorer:
3.3 (b)(1)
Kissinger: What about the minelaying?
Moorer: It is all laid out. We get the school set up. We will have training
going in six weeks.
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
4,
Kissinger: Can they get into Haiphong with A - ls?
Moorer: It is easier farther south, but they could get away with it the
first time.
Schlesinger: Why can't we mine? That isn't hostilities. We could
blockade also, because that is not hostile.
Kissinger: I like mines, because once they are laid, there is nothing we
can do.
Schlesinger: Another thing is we could pick off some shipping as a
reprisal, for example, for a shoot down.
Kissinger: Could we give them A - 7s?
Moorer: There is a training problem. They can fill the channel with A-1s
the first time.
Schlesinger: Are you going to get cozy with the Senate?
Kissinger: The minimum necessary to keep my franchise with the Foreign
Relations Committee. Let's send all we can to GVN. The North Vietnamese
are not holding to the restrictions; why should we?
Colby: Hussein wants to pull out his forces.
Kissinger: Okay, let him.
Colby:
EO 12958
3.3 (b)(1)
Schlesinger: It is getting bad.
TUBRARY GERALD
Kissinger: Portugal is hot for Hawks.
Moorer: They have two problems. There are MIGs in Africa and they are
the only ones who don't have SAMs.
They have a lot of fears, real or not, and they think we are not
helping. It is cosmetics, not military, but still real.
TOP SEGREF/NODIS/XGDS
TOP SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
5.
Kissinger: They are eager for Hawks. They gave me a list. [Passes
out list to all. ] They want protection for their oil fields. Can we give
them boats and missiles?
Moorer: Their oil fields are in the northwest tip and are vulnerable.
Kissinger: Is it illegal?
Moorer: No -- just policy.
Kissinger: I will put it to the President but Brent, get a memo ready.
On the GVN, I think it is essential that there be no debacle --
especially anti-tank.
Schlesinger: We will look into anti-tank. The problem is we gave them
more than they could use.
Moorer: They have a few TOWs.
Schlesinger: We will look into it.
Moorer: Everyone wants TOWs.
LIBRARY GERALD
Kissinger: Why did we have to give 36 to the Jordanians?
Schlesinger: How should we treat the Aussies?
Kissinger: Aloof.
Schlesinger: We are scheduled to deactivate four squadrons of B-52s.
We would leave them in the force structure but eliminate O and M.
There should be a directive to study the foreign policy implications
of energy in the SRG format.
Colby: I sent you a memo on the Persian Gulf. We must upgrade the
sheikhdoms' State representation.
Schlesinger: What about Abu Dhabi?
Colby:
EO 12958
3.3 (b)(1)
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
6.
Moorer: On Portugal, how do we go?
Kissinger: First a memo to the President, then we issue a directive,
Schlesinger: How about a base in Mozambique?
Kissinger: It gets us in trouble. But we need more bases.
Moorer: We are coming up with a study to send to you.
I have talked to Stennis.
Schlesinger: I have talked to Stennis, Mahon, McClellan, Hebert.
Mahon is goosey but the rest are fine.
Kissinger: The Pakistanis want to give us a base.
Schlesinger: We couldn't use it against the Arabs. What's wrong with
Mozambique?
Kissinger/Colby: No, the price is too high.
Kissinger: I'd rather be in South Africa.
GERALD
LIBRATT
Moorer/Schlesinger: Then let's start talking South Africa.
Schlesinger: The Cape Verdes shouldn't be allowed to fall into Soviet
hands.
Kissinger: That is easy. But I think the Portuguese territories will be
lost.
Is there an unpopulated island in the Cape Verdes?
Schlesinger: We have to look.
Kissinger: I'd rather look at South Africa than Portuguese territory.
Colby: How about the Spanish?
Kissinger: Not against the Arabs. How about Ethiopia?
Schlesinger: We have a memo to you on our air base.
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
7.
Colby: How about promising help to the Spanish in Europe?
Kissinger: I don't think I want Spain in Europe. I'd rather have a bilateral
relationship.
Colby:
EO 12958 3.3 (b)(1)(6)
Kissinger:
EO 12958 3.3 (b)(6)
Colby: What if the Hawks win?
Kissinger: We then push them right back.
GERATO FORD
FOR SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 010684
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME
Kissinger/Schlesinger/Colby/Moorer/Scowcr
DESCRIPTION
handwritten version of #010683
CREATION DATE
12/28/1973
VOLUME
11 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
036600064
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEORANDA OF
CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER
3
FOLDER TITLE
December 28, 1973 - Kissinger,
Schlesinger
DATE WITHDRAWN
01/31/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET