Memorandum for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger Regarding Communist Plans to Attack Saigon and Implications of Evacuation Plan

Digitized from Box 19 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library 2ard MEMORANDUM 2284 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL URGENT INFORMATION SECRET April 11, 1975 FORD P. MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN SUBJECT: Communist Plans to Attack Saigon and Implications for Evacuation Plan An attack against Saigon could be imminent, and Hanoi may now be weighing its final decision. Over the past year Hanoi has increased its military actions, step by step, carefully watching for U.S. reaction at each level before escalating to the next higher action. (First they overran one district; then six districts; then six more; then one province; then another province; then whole corps areas. The last decision they have left is whether or not to attack Saigon. Inhibiting such an attack is essential to our evacuation plans. An attack on Saigon can probably only be inhibited by: (1) threat of armed confrontation with the U. S. ; (2) the promise of a political settlement satisfactory to Hanoi. Five separate intelligence reports have been received in the past week indicating that the NVA does intend to attack Saigon some time in the near future. Two of the reports, both from reliable CIA sources, give April 15 as the starting date for these attacks. Other reports indicate attacks on the capital will occur at a later date. An April 9 assessment of the situation by the CIA Station Chief in Saigon concludes that Hanoi now appears to be aiming at maximizing pressure in GVN MR-3 in preparation for a "resolution of the situation" by June 1975. However, he adds that it could be possible for the NVA to modify their tactics and include attacks on Saigon even before that. More recent intelligence reports indicate that pressure against the provinces west and southwest of Saigon is building rapidly, and a major battlefront may develop close to Saigon. Early this week, major parts of the North Vietnamese 5th Division abruptly pulled back from the SECRET DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines CIA Review Jeo By KBH NARA, Date 2/8/00