Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Harry S. Truman

file IAD for SECKET 61 c March 2, 1949 Memorandum of Discussion with The President ARCKIVES s NATIONAL AND a RECORDS - SERVICA* Subject: North Atlantic Pact I told the President that it was necessary to raise with him again the question we had discussed on Monday of the relationship of Italy to the North Atlantic Pact. I brought the President up to date on the Tuesday meeting with the Ambassadors and on the two meetings, one on Monday the other on Tuesday evening with Senators Connally, George and Vandenberg. I then went over with the President the reasons for and against the inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic Pact as contained in the attached memorandum. The President had and wished to keep the ribbon copy of this memorandum. [SEE C.F. you Boy 34-2194844, FOLDER 6"] I then said that it seemed to me that the real issue was not at the present time on the merits of the arguments outlined in the memorandum. The real issue grew out of the position into which we now found ourselves. There had never been a well thought out United States position on the inclusion or exclusion of Italy from the Atlantic Pact which had received the approval of General Marshall or Mr. Lovett and the matter had never been presented for Presidential decision. Nevertheless, in the course of the negotiations, the United States negotiators had drifted into the position that the European nations must take a position upon Italy. This position had now crystallized. France was so emphatically in favor of Italian participation that she had stated, and we believed she meant it, that she would have to reconsider her whole relation to the Pact if Italy was not to be included. Canada now took an affirmative attitude in favor of Italian inclusion. The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, although not as positive as Canada, were novpositive rather than merely non- objecting. The British had stated that they would withdraw their ob- jections if the other nations around the table were in favor of Italian inclusion and we thought that at the next meeting the British objection would be withdrawn. Therefore, the United States would find itself in the position of either accepting the European judgment or rejecting it. I believe that if we reject it we would have serious difficulty with France, considerable delay in the conclusion of the treaty and a good deal of publicity about a split among the Western powers. It seemed TOP SECRET