Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall
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OCR Page 1 of 2ARCHIVES AND
RECORDS NATIONAL
60
SERVICE"
COPY
TOP SBCRE
I
February 19, 1951
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
After talking with Mr. Lovett, it was agreed that it would
be better for me to discuss the attached memorandum with you
rather than to send it on to the White House with possiblos
differences of view to be resolved by the President.
The following points are those which I wish to raise:
1) The draft message proposed by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff suggests that "consideration should also be given to attack
by naval gun fire" It seems to us that such an operation clearly
increases the hazard of an already hazardous attack within seventeon
miles of the Soviet boundary. It could be anticipated that a naval
force would require a screen to the northward. You will recall
that a United Nations air screen in the Yellow Sea shot down a
Soviet plane at a point forty miles from the center of the United
Nations task force. Further, a naval force would be subject to
submarine attack. Lasly, the sinking of a capital ship by Soviet
air or submarine action would represent a far more critical
incident than the loss of certain aircraft.
2) The dangers of a bombing raid close to the borders
of the Soviet Union were discussed at some length with the
President last summer. The attached nemorandum of
September 11, 1950, contains a summary of that problem. At
that time, the President imposed the limitation which General
MacArthur now wishes to raise. One question is whether the
correspondence with Tokyo today indicates now that the dangers
from the supplies in Rashin are significantly greater than last
summer whon it was decided that the danger was not sufficient
to justify continued bombing. Frankly, I do not think that the
incoming messages are very persuasive on this point. The
bombing might have one or both of two objectives; the destruc-
tion of marshalling yards and communications, and the destruc -
tion of the supplies themselves. Is it not possible to deal with
the communications
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, 5-13-2013
By NLT. He NARS Data 6-23-76
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