Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Ambassador of Great Britain Sir Oliver Franks, and William M. Gibson
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OCR Page 1 of 3Copy 2 of 10 copies. s/s
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
106 4667
mon
SECURITY INFORMAT ION
DATE: March 28, 1952
SUBJECT: Interview with British Ambassador; Secretary's Presentation of
113
Preliminary Views Concerning British Memorandum of March 15th
Regarding Indochina
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
Mr. Gibson, PSA
COPIES TO:
The Secretary
G
S/P
EUR (2)
FE
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u. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
16-61120-1
After the customary amenities, the Secretary proceeded to give response to
the British memorandum of March 15th, point by point, as outlined in Mr. Allison¹s
guidance memorandum of March 25th. After he had finished the Ambassador expressed
his thanks and asked if he might summarize the Secretary's presentation in order
to check. He did so as follows:
"We do not believe that the British concern regarding French intentions in
Indochina is justified and cite Mr. Letourneau's comments made at his press
conference March 12th to substantiate our point of view. We have no evidence
that any of the rumors cited in the British memorandum as indications of French
intention to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh or withdraw from Indochina are true. We
would be gratified to have proof of any or of all of them. If it were
obtained we would consider it necessary to reconsider our policy concerning the
French and Indochina generally. We believe that the French will stay in Indo-
china providing they have: (a) assurances of continued US military aid, (b)
sufficient financial aid to assist them with that portion of their budgetary
deficit attributable to the Indochina operation and, (c) reason to expect that
a solution can be found to their manpower problem. It is suggested that this
solution lies in the formation of national armies. We do not believe that the
French are negotiating with Ho Chi Minh if only for the reason that Ho does not
choose to negotiate and could not even if he wished to do so. We do not believe
that the French are planning a withdrawal if only for the reason that such an
operation could not be accomplished successfully without the assistance of the
British and ourselves. We may therefore expect prior notice. We had hoped to
be prepared to present more specific US views on the nature and extent of
DECLASSIFIED
retaliatory
STATE OEPT. LTR. 5-5-3
TOR SECRET
Project NLT f2-4
SECURTIY RITION
By NLT- HL NARS, Date 6-6-13
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