Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Ambassador of Italy Alberto Tarchiani, Minister of National Defense of Italy Randolfo Pacciardi, and Ridgway Knight

Copy 2 of 16 Copies TOP SECRET - SEGURITY INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation pt 135 1560 MA 28 DATE: November 3, 1952 344 944 354 SUBJECT: Trieste and the Fortheoming Exploratory Military Talks in Belgrade PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Mr. Ridgway B. Knight, WE His Excellency Randolfo Pacciardi, Italian Minister of National Defense COPIES TO: Ambassador Tarchiani, Italian Embassy S Embassy, Rome EUR (2) London = the EE (1) Paris WE (2) Belgrade RA (1) USPOLAD, FTT USUN, Hr. Byington Defense u. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61120-1 Mr. Pacciardi gave me a letter from Prime Minister de Gasperi stressing the essential importance of a reasonable solution of the Trieste question before there can be question of military and political cooperation on the part of any Italian Government with Yugoslavia (the text of this letter is attached). Mr. Pacciardi declared that while he had not come to Washington to solve the Trieste question, he had come to do his best in order to avoid a further complication of the solution of this question. Mr. de Gasperi had been deeply impressed by the fact that the United States, British and French Ambassadors had been instructed to call on the Italian Government to inform it of the forth- coming military talks in Belgrade. This was taken by the Italians as an indication of the importance which we placed on these talks and increased their concern accordingly. Mr. Pacciardi repeated the well-known Italian line that the more Yugoslavia is integrated with the West in all fields, regardless of what happens in Trieste, the worse becomes Italy's bargaining position. On several occasions Mr. Pacciardi made it clear that regardless of what we have said to date, the Italians expect some kind of an agreement to come out of the Belgrade military talks. On several occasions and in different words, Mr. Pacciardi asked why, if the military situation did not require it, it was necessary for us to proceed with these military talks with Yugoslavia at this precise time in view of the critical situation facing the Italian Government at home and which might become a real government crisis if the Belgrade conversations became known as would presumably be the case. He stressed the full cooperation which the Italian E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 OP-SECRET - SEGURITY INFORIATION ity 90-11 By to NLT Date 10/11/90 By