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Transcript of Princeton Seminar Discussion, Reel 6, Track 1

  • इसका हिस्सा Dean Acheson Papers, Princeton Seminars Files

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2/14/54, Reel 6, Track 1, Pa 1 MR. HARRIMAN: I mentioned before this case, this question of replacing General Walker with a. more experienced officer, as another indication of the willingness of the Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department to take issue with MacArthur. I got the impression that both General (Collins and General Bradly ey a.greed that General Walker was not as experienced as either General Ridgway or General Van Fleet, but that they were concerned over the possible reaction of replacing Walker on Geheral MacArthur. And I was, of course, very much up- set. Because it seemed perfectly clear that Walker was not up to it. I think I might also recall the fact that the Inchon landings were not an easy grave operation at all; there was great concern expressed by the Navy because of membersof the the very high tides the, as well as the other Chiefs of Staff, because if 1 they got ashore and had some difficulty it the forces couldn't be reinforced until a. new tide came. Remember -- I've forgotten - twenty feet or something, wasn't it? MR. ACHESON: Yes. it avas MR. HARRIMAN: And the water receded to a point where thore were all mud flats. It was not an easy decision; it was a very brilliant conceptions of General MacAr thur every and his staff, and of course it worked brilliantly. But I still feel that and there could U.S. if General Ridgway had been appointed at that time have been a division of the command which occurred later when they broke through to the north -- perhaps you discussed that yesterday -- which caused so much the difficulty in later stages of just prior to the Chinese attack. I've never quite believed that General Ridgway would have been as unconcerned about the possibility of the Chinese communist attack. It is one of those cases where MacArthur made a. military decision based upon his guess of the Chinese communist intentions and not their capabilities. From the little I know about military affairs, it is basic axiom that one must act upon the enemy's capabilities and not his intentions. I suppose you discussed yesterday -