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OCR Page 1 of 132/14/54, Reel 7, Track 1, Pa
1
MR. JOHNSON:
- went ahead without the Indian delegate having instructions. And he later
came and said that his instructions were to approve; but by December and
January this would have been virtually impossible, it seems to me, to go
ahead without the Indians. Isn't there a defelopment that takes place,
in that six months there, that is quite interesting?
MR. ACHESON:
Yes, I think it is true that at this time India emerges as an important
figure, because it was influencing to a great degree other Asian countries.
MR. JOHNSON:
And the government
[?] macArthur ? the country?
MR. ACHESON: Yes. What I said so far indicates the problems of conducting diplomacy and
add
war on these various concentric circles of operation. You now had another
problem, and that is General MacArthur and his wholly undisciplined behavior
TRUNAN
which continues from this point on with increasing embarrassment to everybody.
us
my
As we advanced in Korea, for the second time, the problem of the 38th Parallel
arose again. As you can well imagine, the second time the question of crossing
the 38th Parallel arose, it was infinitely more tender and delicate than it
which was difficult enough.
was even the first time The whole experience of the last operation in the
immediate past was in everybody's mind, and there was strong insistance by
the other countries, both those who had troops in Korea and those who were not
participating in the battle 16/10/16 there, that they must participate in the
decision and that they couldn't have their fortunes determined by unilateral
action on the part of the United States, and particularly by unilateral action
on the part of General MacArthur. The British were quite as hesitaint as
anybody else; everybody was very much concerned with this problem. Our imme-
pre
diate objective in these discussions and in operations here was to onserve as
much tactical freedom as we possibly could for the battle in Korea, that is,
not tolay down as an ironclad rule that no regiment or battalion could cross
the line, because it was impossible to fight a battle under that condition,
but not to commit ourselves to any political or strategic crossing of the line
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