दस्तावेज़
Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the Department of State
- इसका हिस्सा Korean War Files (Truman Administration), Department of State Files
Extracted text
OCR Page 1 of 3INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
6
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
Action
Control: 6280
UNA
Rec'd:
FROM: New York
November 17, 1952
Info
11:31 p.m.
SS
TO: Secretary of State
G
EUR
NO: DELGA 209, November 17, 10:30 p.m.
DECLASSIFIED
NEA
ARA
PRIORITY
Authority
FE
RUS
1952-54
L
(92645-649)
P
Re Korea.
By DEB NLI Date 3-20-85
Meeting twenty-one sponsors held this morning to discuss
developments and particularly Indian draft res.
Secy recalled that he and others had welcomed any suggestions
consistent with fundamental principle non-forcible repatriation
of PWs. Referring to various developments and suggestions,
Secy stressed three essential points any proposal must meet:
(1) Clear and categorical affirmation principle non-forcible
repatriation:
(2) Any commission or other machinery must be workable and de-
signed to determine expeditiously attitudes of PWs;
(3) PW problem must be disposed of in brief period following
armistice with PWs having real choice of either going home or
otherwise being released.
Stressing last point in particular, Secy pointed out that
in truce sense there would not be forcible repatriation if
only choice given to PWs were to go home or remain in indefinite
captivity. If this were only choice given to PWs he noted, it
would require use of force to transfer PWs to commission, which
we could not agree to do. Secy also explained that disposition
non-repatriates is not serious problem. Koreans, who con-
stituted larger portion of PWs, could be assimilated in Korea;
Chinese would be free to go anywhere, with UN offering them care
as refugees until they were in fact resettled. Secy cited as
example Palestine refugees in which UN was caring for much
larger group.
If large numbers these Chinese wanted to go to Formosa he saw
no reason why they should not. Armistice agreement provides
that they would not again participate in Korean. conflict.
If there is risk they might be enrolled in Chinese Nationalist
Armies, there is far greater risk that Commies will enroll in
their armies the many more thousands PWs returning to them.
Referring
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