Memorandum

TON CLODE CLOULL Copy 3 of 5 Copies PLEASE RETURN-TO C y wl O P NA Room 3264 NS April 3, 1951 Subject: Air Counter-Action Against Manchuria. Following discussions between Defense and State on November 13. 1950, the Department transmitted to London, Canberra, Ottawa, and Paris for action, and to Ankere, New Delhi, Wellington, The Hague, Moscow and USUN for information, the attached telegram (No. 2487 to London) requesting the action missions to inform the respective governments "that it may be necessary at an early date to permit UN aircraft to defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to the extent of permitting hot pursuit of attacking enemy aircraft up to two to three minutes flying time into Menchurian air space". The telegram also stated that it was contemplated that UN aircraft would "limit themselves to repelling enemy aircraft engaged in offensive missions into Korea". We did not ask for concurrence of the respective governments but requested the embassies report of reactions. On November 14 the Canadian and Australian Delegations approached the USUN under instructions raising certain questions as set forth in the attached telegram, No. 825 from New York. USUN particularly raised the question as to whether broader consultations on the matter would be useful in New York and expressed the belief that many delegations in New York were genuinely concerned lest unilateral military actions might precipitate an extension of hostilities. The U.S. Delegation stated that among the questions certain to arise in such consultations would be (1) would consultations be held prior to military action in or over Manchuria other than in case of "hot pursuit" (2) does the U.S. as co-sponsor of the Security Council draft Resolution on November 10 referring to the holding of the Sino-Korean frontier "inviolate", intend to amend that paragraph or does the U.S. interpret that and the immediate following paragraph as authorizing action beyond that of hot pursuit. (In general the replies from our missions indicated great alarm by the countries approached over the possibility of our undertaking "hot pursuit" and fear that it would lead to a spread of the hostilities.) In its reply of November 16, 1950, to USUN (No. GADEL 116 repeated to Canberra, Ottewa, Paris, The Hague, Brussels, Ankera, New Delhi, Wellington, Moscow and London, copy attached), the Department stated that it fully recognized the justified interest and concern, particularly, of those governments whose forces are participating in the military action in Korea, over military decisions of the Unified Commend which might entail the possibility of extending the area of hostilities and stated that we will continue to keep such governments informed, as far as possible in advance as to taking such decisions "in order that they may express their views to which full consideration will be given". With respect to the six power draft resolution of November 10 (for which the US and eight other nations voted and was defeated by the Soviet veto). the Department stated it must be considered as a whole and therefore, affirmation of policy of holding Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate must be interpreted in relation to TOD TXIS preceding u OU UULS