Telegram from Ernest Gross to Secretary of State Dean Acheson

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State RE TELEGRAPH BRANCH 11 H TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Action Control: 14216 Rec'd: June 30, 1952 UNA FROM: New York 12:40 p.m. Info TO: Secretary of State SS G NO: 986, June 30, 11:58 a .m. EUR FE L PRIORITY. DCR DCRM Re Korean truce talks. At Malik SC dinner June 27, I had following conversation with Zinchenko (UNASYG) on Korea: While chatting about summer vacation plans, I commented that it did not look as if the SC would have to meet in August. Zinchenko at once said in a questioning manner, "unless perhaps Korea?" I'replied that I thought an armistice in Korea was not possible so long as the Communists insisted on forcible repatriation of POW 's and that I could not understand how the Sov Govt could support the Chi and NK contention in view of principle adopted by Sov Govt regarding German POW 's. Zinchenko, who perhaps expected this question, replied that although he did not know too much about what I -had called a "principle", it was necessary for us to realize there was an "important difference between repatriation during a war and after an armistice". The Geneva Convention "had to be applied" after the end of hostilities. Furthermore, during the war against Nazi Germany, it was "necessary to do everything to disintegrate the Nazis". Moreover, the Sov Govt found great difficulties put in the way of their attempts to get in touch with Russian POW's held in various parts of Europe. He implied the Sov position was taken in the hope of facilitating the return home of Russian POW 's. I said I could not see how these matters affected the fact that the Sov Govt had taken the position that it was a humane principle to allow POW's to go where they desired at end of hostilities. I disagreed with his interpretation of the Geneva Convertion and insisted it was not intended under any circum- stances to require forcible repatriation. This whole question was one we felt deeply about and would not retreat from. I added that representatives of Asian, Middle East, and other countries had expressed to us their full support of this issue, in addition to the public statements which have been made by many govts. Zinchenko replied that he understood the difficulty for us but "we must also realize how difficult it is for the other side". He REPRODUCTION FROM THIS -12 TO SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED