Memorandum of Conversation with F. S. Tomlinson, U. Alexis Johnson, and Walter Treumann
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TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
YMA
Memorandum of Conversation
DC/R
file
DECLASSIFIED
DATE: April 15, 1952
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
SUBJECT: Korea
Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
Byz...
DEB NLT, Date 5-7-55
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. U. A. Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Walter Treumann, NA
I
COPIES TO: s/s FE NA RE BNA UNA SOA
Bureau of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 1 3 1952
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
Department of State
Mr. Tomlinson, at Mr. Johnson's request, called today to discuss the most
recent developments regarding the Greater Sanction Statement and the Korean armis
negotiations.
Greater Sanction Statement
In connection with a previous conversation of March 10, 1952, in which
Mr. Tomlinson had suggested that the United States and the United Kingdom make a
joint approach to the governments of India, Ceylon and Pakistan, presenting them
with the text of the Greater Sanction Statement, Mr. Tomlinson was given copies
of draft telegrams to the United States Missions in Ceylon, Pakistan and India
instructing them to convey jointly with the UK High Commissioners the text and
purpose of the Greater Sanction Statement to the three governments at the approx-
imate time of the signing of the armistice.
Upon reading the draft telegrams, Mr. Tomlinson expressed surprise that we
had already discussed the Greater Sanction Statement with Nehru. Mr. Johnson
stated that we considered it necessary to do this after the British had first
approached the Government of India on this subject without consultation with the
United States and that Mr. Nehru seemed to sympathize with our intent and the
importance which we attach to the Statement, but that he felt that the Statement
should not be publicized. Mr. Nehru was informed that the Statement must be made
public (1) in view of the inevitable leaks which would exaggerate the contents
the Statement, and (2) to explain to the United States public and the world why
we have agreed to an armistice whose inspection provisions otherwise appear
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