Telegram from President Harry S. Truman to Prime Minister Winston Churchill

NLT-307 DECLASSIFIED by authority of a TOP SECRET F.R.1945 20 May 1945 PRIORITY UP.II P.1169 us SERVICOS, AND GOVERN HEMT From: Opnav Initials Date-7-73 7332 To : Alusna, London 2021112, NCR, QEMDS NUMBER 44. TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. Your No. 52, I agree that we cannot leave matters in their present state. It seems our immediate action should be to reject Tito's answer as unsatisfactory and urge him to reconsider his decision. At the same time, I suggest we have Field Marshal Alexander, with assistance from General Eisenhower, immediately re- inforce his front line troops to such an extent that our preponderance of force in the disputed areas and the firmness of our intentions will be clearly apparent to the Yugoslavs. General Eisenhower has already communicated with Field Marshal Alexander concerning preparations for some such action. I suggest that we now direct General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Alexander to proceed with the implementation of a show of force, both air and ground, and that the presentation in Belgrade of our rejection of Tito's stand be timed, if practicable, so that our commanders! troop movements will already be evident to Tito. There should be no question about our commanders taking essential precautions to prevent their forces from being placed in an untenable military position. How- ever, I think we should make very clear to our leaders that this should be done with maximum precautions to insure that the overt act, if any, comes from Tito's forces. It may be that a heavy show of force will bring Tito to his senses. I question, however, that if hostilities should break out, it could be considered as frontier incidents. - 1 - TOP SEGRET