Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

the OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON Dept. E.O. Guidelines, March 7-26-85 6, 1982 12065, Sec. 3-402 May 14, 1952 State By DEB NLT, Date SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS GERMANY High Commissioner McCloy reports that a series of developments over the past fortnight suggest that the Kremlin is embarking on a tough line toward Western Germany. He mentions specifically the stoppage of MP movement from Berlin to Helmstedt, the purge in the East German Government, the heightened militancy of the East German Government toward West Germany, the riot in Essen last week and the shrill statements by Walter Ulbricht on Monday. McCloy says that such a turn was almost inevitable once it became evident that the Soviets tactics of enticement had failed to produce practical political results in the West. The time has now come, I if the Soviets are to succeed in detaching the Federal Republic from the West and causing the EDF to collapse, to impress upon the West Germans the ominous alternative to accepting the package deal offered in the Soviet notes. This is no easy task for the Russians since the German public has gradually become inured to threats from the East; therefore if this tactic of menace is to succeed it must carry a convincing tone of imminent and great danger. At the same time, McCloy reasons, assuming the Kremlin does not seek war, the scope of its threats is limited by what it must re - gard as the risk of an explosive American reaction. Thus the floor and the ceiling are not too far apart. Berlin is of course the most obvious point of exploita- - tion. The Kremlin has already hinted in the Air France and MP incidents what it can do to our most vulnerable point. McCloy believes, neverthe - less, that the Kremlin will not impose a full-scale blockade, for this might well provoke another airlift which would boomerang politically. He thinks it more likely that the Soviets may impose a creeping blockade, possibly even restricting it to out-bound movements from Berlin combined with an offer to absorb all Berlin production in the East The foregoing is of course not all that the Soviets can do by way of intimidation, says McCloy. Moscow may well calculate, as we do, that these measures may not of themselves suffice to stop the con- tractuals and the EDF. What remains is the creation of East German armed forces, border incidents and rumblings of Soviet military power. SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION