Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF E.O. Sec. March 3-402 6, DECLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON 1982 State DEB Dept. Guidelines, NLT, 02-25-85 June 4, 1952 By SECRET SECURITY INFORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA Two Embassy officers called on Prime Minister Chang early yesterday afternoon just as he returned from the Cabinet meet- ing during the course of which President Truman's note was delivered to President Rhee. Chang confirmed earlier reports that Rhee had been in - sisting on the cabinet's endorsement of his plan for dissolving the Assembly when President Truman's message arrived. As Rhee left the room to receive the message he told the cabinet that if they could not accept dis- - solution of the Assembly they must devise some other means to accomplish his ends. Upon returning to the cabinet meeting with President Truman's letter in his hand (which he refused to show to the Prime Minister) Rhee again asked what suggestions the cabinet would make in lieu of dissolving the Assembly and when none were forthcoming Rhee launched into a tirade, reminding the cabinet that "thousands, perhaps millions" of Koreans are streaming toward Pusan to demand dissolution of the Assembly, and warn- ing that there would be terrible disorders in two or three days and the Assemblymen¹s lives would not be worth much before the wrath of the demonstrators. Rhee turned to the Home Minister and ordered him not to prevent the flow of these people into Pusan. At this point in the cabinet meeting Prime Minister Chang pre - sented a draft "compromise" amendment to the constitution for submission by Rhee to the Assembly. Its main provisions are: 1) direct popular election of the President; 2) Prime Minister to be nominated by the Presi- dent and confirmed by the Assembly, which can remove him at any time by a two-thirds no-confidence vote; and 3) the President can only nominate cabinet ministers proposed by the Prime Minister for confirmation by the Assembly. After thinking this matter over for ten minutes Rhee indicated that if Chang thought it could be pushed through the Assembly it might work out all right. Our Embassy officers then showed the Prime Minister a copy of the President*s message to Rhee. Chang expressed pleased amazement that the US Government had acted in such a timely fashion and commented that it must have been this letter that made Rhee change his mind about dissolving the Assembly during the course of his cabinet meeting. Our Embassy officers received the impression that prior to reading the SECRET SECURITY INFORMMATION