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OCR Page 1 of 2NLTCMard
(Aide)
368
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
state Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
June 24, 1952
By DEB NLT, Date TOP 7-24-85
SECRET SECURITY INFORMAT TION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
JAPAN
Prime Minister Yoshida asked Ambassador Murphy to lunch with
him on Sunday, and, during the course of a lengthy conversation,
Yoshida said the following concerning Japan's relations with Nationalist
China. Yoshida is encouraged by reports of the Japanese Special Emis -
sary, Ogata, who has recently been studying conditions in Southeast Asia
and particularly Formosa. Ogata said that Chiang Kai-shek had hinted
he might be thinking in terms of eventual Japanese military intervention on
the Chinese mainland; Yoshida remarked to Murphy that this is evidently
out of the question, as Japan is and will for a long time be unprepared for
military operations. Yoshida said he felt the solution lies in fifth column
penetration and subversion in Communist China, using tactics analogous
to classic Communist methods. In this respect, he asserted, Japan could
be useful. Yoshida hopes that Chiang will react favorably to a Japanese
invitation to send a confidential agent to Tokyo. Yoshida said he hopes to
build a relation of confidence between the Japanese Government and Chiang;
he said he still stands by his letter of last December concerning Japan's
intention to conclude a treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government and
is not worried about the trade angle with Communist China. No important
Japanese businessman, said Yoshida, entertains illusions about trade with
the Chinese mainland under current conditions. He added that he wanted
to conduct matters with the Chinese Nationalist Government under our
friendly "inspection".
JAPAN AND
The Department will refrain from suggestions to the
THE UN
Japanese as to the timing of their application for UN
membership, but we believe it would be desirable to
provide for separate handling of Japan's application by the Security
Council in order to show our own deep interest in Japan's admission and
to place the onus on the USSR if it should veto it. We believe, therefore,
that at the outset of the first Security Council meeting on membership,
either the US or some other friendly member should propose the inclusion,
under agenda item 3 concerning various membership applications, of a
new sub-paragraph which would relate to Japan's application alone. During
consideration of this sub-paragraph the US would express strong support
for Japan's admission and indicate its willingness to bring the application
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION