Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 9-10-85 July 10, 1952 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EGYPT The British have reacted very sharply against an off-hand US suggestion we made yesterday in regard to their new position paper on Egypt--namely that they should designate some outstanding indi- vidual to undertake further consultation with the Sudanese over recognition of Farouk as king. A Foreign Office official told an officer of Embassy London that this would merely be going through the motions since all indica- - tions are that the Sudanese will not accept Farouk's title; moreover the Egyptians would never accept a verdict reached by a British subject and would inevitably charge that the consultations were conducted unfairly. Our Embassy officer pointed out that this would depend largely on how the con- sultations were carried out. The British might ask, explain, urge or use pressure with the Sudanese; "asking" would undoubtedly not bring about the desired results and the UK maintains that "pressure" would raise domestic problems in the UK, but perhaps "explaining" or "urging" would bring about the desired results. To this the Foreign Office official replied most firmly that the UK could not even "give the Sudanese a lead" on this question, because of domestic difficulties it would raise in the UK and because of the reactions in the Sudan. The most that might be done would be to suggest the nature of guarantees which the Sudanese should ask for in return for recognition, but these would undoubtedly not be acceptable to the Egyptians and it is doubtful that the Sudanese would be willing to accept the title even with such guarantees. The Foreign Office spokesman particularly stressed his concern regarding present Anglo-American differences on this question, which he felt perhaps were even more important from the point of view of Anglo-American relations than the Anglo-Egyptian aspect. He stressed the importance of our maintaining a common front vis-a-vis the Egyptians, without which he felt there was not much prospect of a settlement. He said that the Foreign Office is very apprehensive lest the whole situation is drifting toward a return of the nationalistic Wafd party and that only a strong, coordinated intervention by the US and the UK can halt that trend and bring about a settlement. SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION