Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

the OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE they WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, State By DEB Dept. NLT, Date 9-10-85 Guidelines, March 6, 1982 August 18, 1952 SECRET SEC URITY INF ORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN: In a brief conversation with our Ambassador in Tehran yesterday morning, Prime Minister Mosadeq said that he had had a talk with the British Charge in Tehran and had told him that he was prepared to recommend to the Iranian Cabinet and Legislature that the oil dispute be submitted to the International Court of Justice. Stating that the recent decision of the Court had caused Iran to have confidence in it, he said that he thought he could prevail on the Cabinet, the Legislature and Iranian public opinion to accept submission of the question of compensation to the Court, but doubted that he could obtain acceptance of submission to any other kind of arbitration. He said he could not, however, submit this suggestion to the Cabinet and Legislature unless it could be accompanied by a statement that the British were willing to accept the nine-point nationalization law. Our Ambassador comments that he is convinced that Mosadeq at this time is not bargaining and has gone as far as it is possible for him to go, and doubts that he or any successor will be able later to effect any arrangement more advantageous that this offer which he has made. He also stated that he was shocked by Mosadeq's appearance and that the Prime Minister is clearly extremely ill. When he called for the appointment for this conver- - sation, Mosadeq's secretary said that the Prime Minister had been extremely ill the previous evening and in fact for a time it looked as though he might not survive the night. Meanwhile, our Embassy in London reports that the British Foreign Office appears encouraged by Mosadeq's response to their Charge's approach and believes that the problem is to evolve some formula which Mosadeq could accept but which would not involve outright acceptance of the nine-point nationalization law nor rejection of the validity of the 1933 concession agreement. The Foreign Office appears to believe that it is not beyond the realm of ingenuity to devise such a formula. Commenting on this attitude, our Ambassador in Tehran has expressed his regret that the UK is still hesitating to accept SEGRET SECURITY INF ORMATION