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OCR Page 1 of 2OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
State the Dept. E.O. 12065, Ivvidalines, NLT, Date. 4-10-8 8
Sec. March 3-402 6,
1982
August 20, 1952
BY
DCB
SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
Trieste
The American, British and French ambassadors
to Belgrade delivered to Marshal Tito on Monday
the tripartite aide-memoire on Trieste which urges the resumption
of Italo-Yugoslav negotiations and a settlement of the Trieste
problem. The three ambassadors also made an oral statement that
the three governments would not support further territorial claims
of either Italy or Yugoslavia if a Trieste settlement were reached.
Tito's immediate reaction to the aide-memoire
was one of undisguised irritation and resentment. He said that the
aide-memoire intimated that it was Yugoslavia's fault that no Trieste
settlement had been reached. He asked why no account had been
taken of several Yugoslav proposals for a settlement and why Yugosla-
via alone was continually being asked to make concessions. Our
ambassadors pointed out that previous Yugoslav positions had been
taken into account but that it had been all the more surprising when
the Yugoslav ambassador in London recently indicated a retrenchment
in Yugoslavia's position.
During an informal conversation at lunch which
followed the presentation of the aide-memoire, Tito reviewed the
Italo-Yugoslav negotiations in a more relaxed atmosphere, and
emphasized Yugoslavia's desire to find a solution and its readiness
to accept the ethnic principle "even though the city and port of Trieste
itself was of considerable economic importance to Slovenia and of
little economic importance to Italy". He discussed various aspects
of possible "ethnic" settlements in some detail, but he emphasized
that his remarks were not to be construed as definitive statements
of the Yugoslav position which would be forthcoming, after consul-
tations with his ministers, at the proper time.
Iran
Prime Minister Mosadeq yesterday sent for
Ambassador Henderson's Persian assistant,
Saleh, who usually accompanies Henderson when he calls on Mosadeq.
Mosadeq was apparently somewhat stronger than on the previous day
but in such a highly nervous and excited condition that Saleh was afraid
SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION