Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Haval OFFICE OF DECLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By Dob NLT, Date 9-1080 August 29, 1952 TOP SECRET SECURITY INE ORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS BALTIC Our Ambassador at Oslo had discussed with Admiral MANEUVERS Brind details of the Baltic phase of MAINBRACE. He reports that apparently the main reasons for having a Baltic phase of MAINBRACE are that (a) Danish forces need the experience, especially in conjunction with Allied Forces; (b) the Danes would also derive much reassurance as to Allied concern for Danish defense and willingness to aid directly in it and (c) the Danish military planners under Admiral Brind proposed and developed the Baltic phase of the exercise themselves, although without much initial political guidance, and would have had ships of several nationalities calling at Bornholm if Admiral Brind, and later the NATO Standing Group, had not modified that portion of the plan. As now planned, the exercise calls for three light British Naval vessels to proceed 30 nautical miles eastward of Bornholm. These vessels will then move west toward the Danish coast simulating an attacking force; taking care to stay at least 15 miles away from the non- Danish coast. Allied submarines, MTBs and other small craft are supposed to detect and intercept. The only vessels putting into Bornholm are to be small Danish craft for refueling purposes during one day. Allied aircraft will not go out over the Baltic area. The waters thus being utilized by the naval units have been chosen partly because they are about the only ones in the eastern Baltic deep enough for submarines and because they have heretofore been used for naval exercises by the Danes and even by the British in connection with the Danes. From a strictly military viewpoint, the Baltic phase and especially the Bornholm part of it is a relatively minor segment of the whole. If necessary, the exercise could be modified by eliminating the refueling visit to Bornholm and even by moving the eastern limit of the exercise further west. Our Ambassador gathered that such limitations would have their technical disadvantages. Admiral Brind has informed SHAPE that if the final decision is to modify the exercise, he would endeavor to handle his next public announcement in such a manner as to minimize reaction thereto. He considers he has not so far disclosed just how far east his ships actually will go. He had publically confirmed that no American forces would participate in the Baltic and that no "foreign forces" would go to Bornholm. TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA