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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT/Naval Aidc)388
N they
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. E.O. Guidelines, Date March 6,
1982
By DEB NLT, 9-10-05
September 2, 1952
TOP SECRET SEC URITY INF ORMA TION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
BALTIC
Foreign Secretary Eden has reiterated to Ambassador
MANEUVERS
Gifford Churchill's concern over the Bornholm phase
of the MAIN BRACE operation. Churchill is particularly
disturbed over the plans for a simulated attack on Bornholm by British
ships proceeding from thirty miles east of the Danish island. Eden is
instructing the British Embassy here to seek a US-UK agreed position prior
to the meeting of the NATO Standing Group on September 3. As a result
of his talk with Eden, however, Gifford believes that the British will
not seek the operational abandonment of the Bornholm phase, as Churchill
first proposed. Rather, they will probably suggest that the attack on
Bornholm be canceled, that non-Danish forces go no further east than
14 degrees east longitude (west of Bornholm), and that, to avoid the
appearance of "backing down, " the refueling visit to Bornholm by Danish
ships take place as planned.
IRAN
Disputing the assertions by Ambassador Henderson
and British Charge Middleton that the joint US-UK -
message was being resubmitted in a spirit of friendliness toward Iran and
in the sincere hope that it would lay the basis for a solution of the oil
problem, Mosadeq stated that it would have "an evil effect" and surmised
that the bearers of the note wi shed to get rid of him and bring in another
government. Mosadeq also predicted that his government would never
accept the suggested proposals.
Subsequently, Henderson was informed by Minister of
the Court, Ala, that Mosadeq was deeply resentful at what he considered
to be a lack of consideration for him on the part of the United States. Ala
suggested that Henderson call on Mosadeq to assuage his pride and to
convince him that his suspicions of the United States were without founda- -
tion. In the light of our policy of a joint approach with the British,
Henderson has asked whether or not he should see Mosadeq if it appears
that such a visit would be helpful.
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMA TION