Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NCT(NAVAL AIDE)413 OFFICE OF DECLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE May E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NTT, Date 9-10-85 October 21, 1952 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN We believe it most likely that internal political pressures will force Prime Minister Mosadeq to carry out his public threat to break relations with Britain unless he has some substantial reason for taking the political risk of not doing so. We consider it inadvisable, however, to discuss our proposed formula with Mosadeq until the British position is known. Accordingly, we have authorized Ambassador Henderson to tell Dr. Mosadeq at the earliest opportunity: 1) The US Government is working on ideas which might be useful in resolving the oil dispute, but we will not be in a position to put forward any sug- gestions within the time limit (October 22) set by Mosadeq before breaking relations with the UK. We will hope to obtain Mosadeq's views during informal and secret conversations before the ideas become set as formal proposals. 2) The Anglo-Iranian oil dis- - pute has reached the point where each side seems to be adhering to principles which are difficult to abandon in the face of aroused public opinion. The major problems of the oil dispute seem to have been settled and there now remain only the questions of com- pensation and commercial arrangements for the sale of Iranian oil, which should not prove insuperable obstacles. 3) If the break has not occurred by the time Henderson sees Mosadeq, our Ambas- sador is to add that the US Government does not consider breaking UK-Iranian relations will contribute to the settlement of Iran's problemp 4) Should Henderson consider it necessary, Mosadeq may be informed that we would not object to his issuing a state- ment saying the diplomatic break with Britain was delayed at his request. Meanwhile, Department officers now in London are discussing specific problems involved in a settlement with British Foreign Office and AIOC officials. Theyinclude the ade- quacy of the amount of compensation due the UK, the effect upon TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION