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OFFICE OF
DECLASSIFIED
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
WASHINGTON
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
By DEB NLT, Date 9-11-85
December 3, 1952
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
WESTERN
A UK Foreign Office representative has told
EUROPE
Embassy London that although ratification of
the European Defense Community (EDC) had been postponed,
the British believe it will be achieved and are still banking on
it. The UK spokesman pointed out that no alternative method
of bringing German forces into Western defense arrangements
had been evolved. While the British are not in a position to
needle France on ratification, they have been conducting military
talks for several months with the French. By this means the
British expect to live up to their declared policy of establishing
the closest possible relationship with the EDC. In the British
view, it may be necessary to wait until Easter for French ratifi-
cation. The danger now looming is that France may attach con-
ditions which may make it necessary to renegotiate the EDC
treaty. The UK official believed German parliamentary action
should come this week, followed by a favorable court opinion
and other steps necessary to complete German ratification in
due course. Reports received from the British observer in-
dicate slow progress is being made on the complex questions
involved working out the European Political Community. The
British also state they are working seriously to aid the develop-
ment of the European inland transport organization.
TRIESTE
Embassy London reports the Italians have learned
in advance of our proposal for settlement of the
Trieste problem, presumably through the French, who apparently
informed a ranking UN official. While Foreign Secretary Eden
has not yet taken a position on the plan, the Foreign Office is
considering how the Italian knowledge of the plan affects the
situation. The British official may recommend that our ap-
proach now be made to Prime Minister DeGasperi. If DeGasperi
reacts unfavorably, the plan should be dropped; if he reacts
favorably we must again consider where we stand, bearing in
mind the unfavorable Yugoslav reaction anticipated by the British.
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION-