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OCR Page 1 of 2the
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
1982
State Dept. DEB Guidelines, NLT, Date March 9-11-85 6,
January 5, 1953
By
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
USSR
The British Ambassador to Warsaw has informed
our Embassy there of a conversation between him
and a Polish Foreign Office official regarding Soviet-American
relations. The Polish official stated it was his view that only
the United Kingdom was in a position to mediate helpfully at this
juncture and intimated that British good offices would be welcomed.
The Polish official also stated that more importance should be
attached in the current situation to Stalin's reply to the questions
submitted by James Reston, and inquired whether Churchill's
plans for conversations in the United States had been modified
in this connection. The British Ambassador thought that the
Polish official had intended to convey the intimation of a Polish
(Soviet ?) hope that the suggestion would be sent to London that
the Soviets would welcome a mediation effort by Churchill with
the new US administration and that the Polish official was probably
acting under instructions on behalf of the USSR.
Quite independently of the above, the Yugoslav Charge
in Warsaw expressed to our Embassy the view that importance
should be attached to the Stalin replies. He believed the Soviets
may be in a mood to compromise with the United States but not
prepared for reasons of prestige to do so in multilateral nego-
tiations. His reasoning was that the Soviets were embarrassed
by the serious deterioration during 1952 of economic conditions
in the satellites plus the growing strength of the NATO countries
to such an extent that Soviet commitments in the Far East were
becoming burdensome. He also believed that Soviet relationships
with other Communist regimes, including China, was such that the
USSR thought it must keep the control of Communist foreign rela-
tions strictly in its own hands and negotiate directly with the United
States any compromise deemed expedient.
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATON