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OCR Page 1 of 3NLT(Naval Aide) 164
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DELLASSITED
E.O. Guidelines, March 9-7-85 6, 1982
12065, Sec. 3-402
January 30, 1951
State DEB Dept. NLT, Date
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By
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
UNITED KINGDOM
In response to our request, Embassy London has
submitted a study of UK thinking and motives
which will be used in making a careful examination of differences between
the US and UK as reflected in their Far Eastern policies and tactics in the
UN. The Embassy prefaces its study with certain assumptions regarding
Communist tactics, among which is the observation that the Communists
cannot fail to be conscious of obvious progress in their campaign to drive
a wedge between the US and UK and probably their Far East strategy for
the present will be to exploit it to their advantage and by equivocation,
ambiguity and change of pace attempt to follow up their success rather
than precipitate the situation (for instance by an attack on Hong Kong)
which they realize would speedily unite the West even if not the West and
Asia.
The British think that recent conversations have
been unfruitful in resolving fundamental differences. The Embassy be -
lieves, however, that we should continue our attempts to reconcile our
positions, and states that it does not dispair of some success as it feels
the British position is neither willful nor capricious but rather founded on
sincerély and widely held opinions even though such opinions may be of
doubtful validity. British distrust of our Far East policies and actions
stems from two basic reactions. First, they feel that although neither
country sees clearly very far ahead, we push ahead with 11-considered
haste and impatience, whereas the unclear future induces in the British
caution and a desire to proceed on the assumption that war can be avoided,
as long as doing so does not seriously prejudice the strength of our posi-
tion in case war actually does eventuate. Second, they feel we under
estimate the strictly Asian forces and factors which help the Bolsheviks
to utilize the Far East situation successfully to further their own ends.
In terms of policy, the primary British concern is
to find an effective Far East policy on which both the UK and US agree
and which will avoid a split between the West and Asia (especially India),
will preserve the UN, and will avoid world war. Neither the UN nor the
principle of collective security can, in their view, be salvaged by an
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