Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 February 15, 1951 By DEB NLT, Date 9-Y-85 SECRET SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS YUGOSLAVIA Embassy Belgrade reports that during a conversation with Tito and Foreign Minister Kardelj on February 13, Assistant Secretary Perkins stated that US Ambassadors to Cominform countries did not think either the satellites or the USSR were preparing for an imminent attack anywhere in Europe. Tito and Kardelj both said their own information lead them to the same conclusion. Tito added that from his knowledge of Soviet psychology he did not think they would take any action which would label the USSR as an aggressor in world opinion. During the same conversation Kardelj expressed appreciation for the Secretary's recent press conference statement regarding Yugoslavia and indicated that government's satisfaction with our public position. Perkins referred to Yugoslav requests for further assistance and pointed out the present attitude of the US public and Congress would make additional assistance most difficult to obtain without a clear indication by the Yugoslav Government of what it would do in case of war. The Yugoslavs replied that public opinion inside Yugoslavia was not ready for such alignment, but in another year this situation might be different. Tito said the Yugoslav people, in case of aggression against Yugoslavia, must be absolutely certain their government had done nothing whatever to justify Soviet allegations that the Western powers had had aggressive intentions against the USSR with Yugoslavia as a base of opera- tions. Tito said he wished to avoid public debate regarding Yugoslav military supplies and hoped that they could be obtained on the basis of long-term loans through commercial negotiations. Perkins explained that any further substantial aid from the US would require appropriations by Congress and mentioned that an additional difficulty resulted from priorities established among NATO countries. Tito remarked that at least each understood the other's situation and perhaps for the moment Yugo- slavia would have to depend on its own resources. He added, however, if Yugoslavia became convinced an attack against Yugoslavia had been SECRET