Images (2)
दस्तावेज़
| id |
id
196816694
|
|---|---|
| contentType |
contentType
document
|
| source |
source
import
|
Source image fields (6)
Extracted text
OCR Page 1 of 2NLT/Naval Aide)182
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
March 15, 1951
TOP
NLT, Date 9-7-86
SECRET
By DEB
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
FOUR-POWER
At the ninth session of the Paris talks
EXPLORATORY TALKS
on Wednesday the Soviets presented the
following revised draft agenda: 1) Re- -
garding fulfillment by the Four Powers of the Potsdam Agreement on
demilitarization of Germany; 2) Problems relating to reestablishment
of German unity and preparation of the treaty of peace; and 3) Exami-
nation of the causes of present international tensions in Europe and of
means to securing a real and lasting improvement in relations between
the USSR, US, UK and France, including the question of reduction of
armed forces of the Four Powers--USSR US, UK and France.
Although the above agenda appears at
first sight to offer considerable concessions to the Western point of
view and does apparently make some concessions, it still is far from
acceptable in several major respects, and must be very carefully
studied.
The new Soviet item 2 represents the
tripartite version which the Soviets have accepted without modifica-
tion, and the new Soviet item 3 represents the original tripartite item
1 with the addition of the question of the reduction of the armed forces
of the Four Powers. However, the Soviets seem adamant on discussing
the question of Germany at the beginning of the agenda and on leaving
the question of international tensions until the end- position which we
feel is illogical and which undermines our basic contention that the
rearmament of Germany is a result, not a cause, of international ten-
sions. Furthermore, as to the possibility of a reduction of the armed
forces of the Four Powers, contained in the new Soviet item 3, we feel
that reference must be made to the existing level of armaments which,
in itself, is a cause of international tension, i. e. the disparity between
Soviet and Western armaments.
I O P
S ECRET