Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 By DEB NLT, Date 9-4-85 March 21, 1951 SECRET SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS F OUR-POWER - At the 14th session of the Paris talks EXPLORATORY TALKS yesterday the Soviet delegate tabled a new version of the agenda item on inter- - national tensions: "Examination of the causes of present international tensions in Europe and of means necessary to secure a real and lasting improvement in the relations between the USSR, US, UK and France, in- cluding questions of reduction of armed forces of the USSR, US, UK and France and of the establishment of international control over the imple - mentation of reduction of armed forces, as well as of other measures for elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression, and the question of the fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements of the four powers. " Ambassador Jessup replied that the Soviets were saying, in effect, that the US has certain policies, in particular its defense policy, which the Soviets do not like and desire to change, and that the Soviets want the US to accept an agenda item which constitutes an agreement that the US will change its policies. Jessup pointed out that this attempt to insert substantive issues into these pre- liminary talks contradicted the Soviet position in its note of February 5 stating that the Deputies meeting should be confined to the agenda and that the substance of questions should not enter into the meeting. The British delegate supported Jessup's points and stated that the Soviets' refusal to include the "existing level of armaments" in the agenda indicated clearly that the Soviets were trying to prejudice the agenda in advance. In the tripartite talks preceding yester - day's session of the Four, the French and British delegates indicated to Ambassador Jessup that they were willing to accept the Soviets desire to include the "demilitarization of Germany" on the agenda (which we stead- fastly oppose) and could not justify a break with the Soviets over it. SECREI