Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(Naval Aidel188 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED April 6, 1951 12065, Sec. 3-402 TOP E.O. Guidelines, March 9-7-8 6, 1982 S ECRET State DEB Dept. NLT, Date SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS By FOUR-POWER - Conversations took place yesterday on EXPLORATORY TALKS an informal basis at a Soviet Embassy luncheon. They produced no definite new indications of the Soviet position but some incidental remarks by Semenov to Bohlen and by Gromyko to Parodi, Davies and Jessup are interpreted by our delegation as an indication that the NAT and US bases item is just a bargaining point with the Soviets. Jessup feels that the Soviets' real ob- jective for the CFM lies in the reduction of armaments, for he feels that the Soviets are primarily concerned with halting the US rearmament pro- gram whose dimensions and potentialities they probably appraise accurately and realistically. In a conversation between Semenov and Bohlen, Semenov emphasized repeatedly that the "arms race" was a very vital factor in the world situation and he attempted at some length to re- fute the idea that the Soviet Union was arming heavily. He said that the American military program in its vast scale bore no relation to Soviet armaments at the present time and it could only be interpreted by the Soviets as preparation for war or, at best, a political position in which, judging from statements of American officials, the US would lay down a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum to the Soviet Union. Semenov said that Bohlen should know well from his experience in the Soviet Union that the Russians do not react with weakness to any such tactics. GREECE-YUGOSLAVIA - The Greek Prime Minister has informed Ambassador Peurifoy that the Yugoslav Minister has just made a formal inquiry as to what action Greece would take in the event Yugoslavia were attacked. The Prime Minister replied that Greece would presumably mobilize and would assist Yugoslavia economically, but that before giving any further or definite assurances he would have to consider the matter carefully. Peurifoy says that Venizelos will pro- bably await being advised of a US position on his reply before taking the matter up again with the Yugoslavs, and Peurifoy feels that it is most TOP SECREI