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OCR Page 1 of 2OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
May 3, 1951
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
By DEB
NLT, Date 9-5-85 SEGRET
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
FOUR POWER
At the 42nd session of the Paris talks yesterday
PARIS TALKS
Jessup introduced on behalf of the Western
Powers the new three-alternative agenda
proposal. Gromyko's immediate reaction was negative. He took the
general position that the new proposal was not indicative of any effort
by the Western Powers to facilitate agreement on the agenda and that
only the words, not the substance, of the Western position had been
changed. Gromyko posed three questions in order to seek clarification:
1) Why did the West oppose discussion of the NAT and US bases?;
2) Was the listing of German demilitarization as number one sub-item
in Alternative A dependent on the Soviets' acceptance of the Western
wording on armaments and armed forces? and 3) Was agreement on
the Trieste item subject to Soviet acceptance of the Western wording
on all other agenda items? Jessup will answer these questions at the
next meeting which is scheduled for tomorrow afternoon.
We have informed Jessup that we feel the
proposed aide-memoire to the Soviet Government should best be toned
down somewhat to avoid the "ultimatum flavor which might leave us
open to charges of breaking off negotiations. On the other hand we
feel that Gromyko's negative response to the proposals yesterday may
give us a useful peg for increasing the effectiveness of the aide -
memoire, and we might include a reference to his immediate, negative
response before he had carefully considered the proposals or submitted
them to his Government, which, we might indicate, raised the ques- -
tion in our minds of whether the Soviets were not interested in a meet-
ing of the Foreign Ministers. We also indicated to Jessup that we
think it might be advisable to speed up the delivery of the aide-memoire
rather than to wait several days as originally contemplated.
IRAN
Ambassador Grady made his first official
call on Prime Minister Mossadeq yesterday.
Mossadeq was most cordial, expressed appreciation for our non-
interference, and confidence in our good intentions, but he was most
ECRET