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OCR Page 1 of 2OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
June 26, 1951
By DEB NLT, Date 9-5-85
S-E C R E T
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
KOREA
We have informed our Embassy in Moscow and our
Mission to the UN that we believe it is desirable to
limit our discussion at this stage on the Malik statement to an attempt
to clarify certain points. We do not wish to embark on negotiations on
cease-fire and armistice arrangements without knowing more about what
the Soviets had in mind. The attitude of our representatives, therefore,
is to be one of seeking answers to questions in order that the US Govern-
ment might understand what Malik was saying without attempting to state
the views of the US Government on such points.
Embassy Moscow is to seek clarification from
Vishinsky or Gromyko and US-UN discreetly from Malik by means of the
following questions:
1) Does Malik's phrase "the Soviet peoples believe"
entitle us to believe that this is also the view of the Soviet Government?
If so, is that government prepared to support steps toward a peaceful
settlement?
2) Is there significance to the phrase "a cease-fire
and an armistice"? What does Malik have in mind in appearing to draw
a distinction between the two?
3) Does the Soviet Government have any specific steps
in mind (as to procedure)?
4) Does the Soviet Government know whether Malik's
statement represents the view of Peiping?
5) Is the Soviet Government prepared to support a
meeting of representatives of the field commanders to discuss arrange -
ments?
The British Embassy has been informed of the above
steps and we have acceded to the British request that British UN delegate