Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE the WASHINGTON State By DE Dept. B NLT, Date 9-5-85 E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 July 26, 1951 S ECRE I SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS INDOCHINA Ambassador Bonnet called on the Secretary recently to discuss the defense of Indochina, with particular reference to the possible effects of a truce in Korea. Bonnet said his Government was eager to determine, as far in advance as possible, what steps could be taken by the US, UK and France to de. - fend Indochina successfully in the event of a large-scale Chinese inter- vention. Bonnet suggested two possible courses of action for anticipating and forestalling Chinese intervention: 1) US, UK, French discussions for implementation of recommendations made by the Military Conference at Singapore; and/or 2) Discussion by "interested parties" of guarantees against Chinese aggression in parts of Asia other than Korea. The Secre- tary took the occasion to suggest the desirability of Schuman's personally participating in the Japanese Treaty ceremony in San Francisco, following which the Secretary implied he would discuss this matter with Schuman. Bonnet first agreed this would be desirable but later pointed out that he thought Schuman would be unable to attend if the Associated States of Indo- - china were excluded from the list of signatories. The Secretary assured Bonnet that the Department is seriously considering the manner in which the Singapore recommendations should be carried out and the manner in which the security of other Asian countries might be assured in the event of a Korean truce. He also assured Bonnet that we were trying to find a formula for inclusion of the Associated States as Japanese Treaty signa- tories in the face of opposition from other Asian states. UNITED KINGDOM The Labour Party's National Executive Com- mittee met yesterday and adopted a policy statement for submission to its October party conference which fully reflects the general lines of government policy and supports the defense program. Aneurin Bevan and his three supporters on the Executive Committee voted against various provisions of the statement but did not make a serious row. Bevan and his supporters did not resign and apparently do not intend to do so at this stage. Our Embassy comments that they probably decided to remain on the Executive because: 1) they seem to be gaining some grounds within the Party and hope to capitalize on the dissatisfaction with government policy