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दस्तावेज़
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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT(Naval Aide) 228
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
the
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
July 30, 1951
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
By DEB NLT, Date 9-5-85 TOP SEGRET
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
NATO Meeting
We have informed our Deputy on the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization that we believe
it would be premature to schedule a meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in mid-September, principally because it would probably not
be possible to make any major progress on the German problem or the
gap program by so early a date. We feel that, quite aside from the
intrinsic need for making concrete progress on these problems, public
reaction to a Council meeting would be one of severe disappointment if
these problems remained unsolved. We feel that it would be best for
Van Zeeland to announce now that the annual meeting of the Council is
to be held in Rome in October, stating at the same time that advantage
would be taken of the presence in the US around mid-September of many
of the Foreign Ministers and Finance Ministers to hold a preliminary
meeting in Ottawa for a general discussion of current non-military NATO
problems.
We have instructed our Deputy to tell his
colleagues privately that the US is most anxious that at the October
meeting final action can be taken on Greece and Turkey; otherwise we
face a great risk of losing the full support of Turkey.
INDIA-PAKISTAN -
Mr. Attlee approved on Saturday instructions
to the British High Commissioners in New Delhi
and Karachi directing them to make strong oral statements to the re-
spective governments: 1) emphasizing the seriousness of the situation
between India and Pakistan; 2) stating that the UK relies on the pronounce
-
ments of the Prime Ministers of both governments that they have no in-
tention to resort to war; 3) saying that the placement of troops of both
governments is such as might lead to war; and 4) recommending to both
governments that they institute immediate withdrawal of their forces.
Meanwhile Prime Minister Liaquat has sent
another message to Prime Minister Nehru, the third is the present