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OCR Page 1 of 2C
MLTCHaval graduate Aide)231
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 3, 1951
TPSECROT
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
NORTH ATLANTIC
Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson, now in
TREATY
London, has given Ambassador Gifford pri-
vately what he considers the high point of his
recent conversations with the Foreign Ministers of the Scandinavian coun-
tries and the Netherlands. The latter all indicated their preoccupation
with the Russian reaction to admission of Greece and Turkey to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Norwegian had told Pearson the Soviets
had warned the Norwegians that the establishment of foreign bases in Nor -
way would be regarded by the Soviets as "provocative". The Norwegian
and the Danish Foreign Ministers both stated that before reaching a de -
cision on Greece-Turkey, they must know what command structure was
contemplated and particularly what other non-NAT countries might be
included, since this would involve all NAT countries in additional indirect
commitments. The Swedish Foreign Minister indicated to Pearson that
Sweden was desirous of strengthening its cooperation with the North
Atlantic countries in all non-military fields, both to reduce its own sense
of isolation and to help remove the "curse of the anti-Soviet nature" of the
NATO. (Pearson remarked at this point that he believed Sweden's isolated
status was making it do at least as well if not better than most European
NATO countries in strengthening its own defense.)
The Norwegian, Danish and Dutch Foreign
Ministers all told Pearson they felt some action looking toward closer
North Atlantic non-military cooperation would be of material assistance
to them in securing parliamentary and public support for tieing in Greece
and Turkey, even if this were to be done by a interlocked Mediterranean
pact, but particularly if the decision was for full membership.
Pearson said he had been frequently asked what
the US would do when it reached the pinnacle of the strength it was now
building. Had the US reached a decision that its objective was not to pre -
vent a war but rather to win one ? He said he had consistently replied that
TSpEBET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
By
DEB NLT, Date 9-5-85