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OCR Page 1 of 2OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
August 10, 1951
State By DEB NLT, Date 9-5-85
H
T
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
GREECE-TURKEY
A member of the French NATO delegation in
London has informed Mr. Spofford that the
French position on the admission of Greece and Turkey to the NATO, sub-
ject to confirmation when the new government is formed, is as follows:
France would have preferred a separate, inter-locked pact, but it will not
oppose full membership provided the command structure is satisfactorily
settled. France thinks both Greece and Turkey should be under SHAPE
and that any Middle Eastern command should be under the Standing Group
as such rather than a separate body composed of Standing Group members
and Turkey. The French fear that such a separate body, even though com-
posed of the three persons who comprise the Standing Group, would, with
the addition of Turkey and possibly a Dominion representative, have in-
terests and responsibilities in conflict with those of the Standing Group.
The French delegate stated that unless any Middle Eastern command were
directly subordinate to the Standing Group as such France would not agree
to full membership.
UNITED KINGDOM
Embassy London reports that the whole tone and
language of recent parliamentary debates on the
Middle East foreshadows a sterner British policy in the area when these
countries show themselves as victims of irresponsible nationalism. The
Conservatives, if they come to power, will almost certainly establish a
tougher British policy, but the Labor Government's own impatience with
the Middle East, plus domestic political pressures, is already leading to
a stiffer British attitude. The British take their "major responsibility"
for the Middle East seriously and will look to the US for closer support in
fulfilling this responsibility. But the British will look to us to support, not
supplant, their own efforts. Welcoming our aid, they will listen to our
advice, but they will definitely not want to be displaced or relegated to a
secondary role in the Middle East. Our Embassy comments that, since our
own commitments throughout the world are already so heavy, it is in our
best interests to reap the maximum benefits from the present intense British
interest in the Middle East and their willingness to shoulder responsibility
there.