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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
August 20, 1951
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
By DEB
NLT, Date 9-5-85
E C R E F
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
FRANCE
In recent conversations with an officer of our Paris
Embassy several French Foreign Office Officials have
raised the question of the French attitude toward recognition of Communist
China and its entry into the United Nations. There was no indication that
the Foreign Office would favor either of these two courses, but, says our
Embassy, there is such desperate casting around for a solution in Indochina
that, if the Kaesong talks should succeed, there would be considerable support
in French political circles for negotiations to settle all Far East problems in
the hope that somehow a solution for the seemingly never-ending Indochina
question might be found in this context. The Embassy says that it finds no
illusions on this score among Foreign Office officials, but political pressures
among all except the Gaullists might well build up along these lines.
IRAN
The long-pending Export-Import Bank loan to Iran, which
the Iranian Parliament has ratified after many months of
delay, has latterly come to have political connotations which did not exist at
the time it was first offered. The British object strenuously to our extending
the loan at this time, feeling that it would encourage the Iranians to take a
more intransigent stand in the oil negotiations and that it would be interpreted
by the Iranians (and the British public) as a token of our partiality to Iran in
the dispute. The Department, however, wishes to avoid the implication of any
consideration being given to withdrawing the loan or to delaying tactics, and
we have instructed Ambassador Grady to pursue the matter in a normal manner.
However, we are equally anxious that the Iranians, especially Mosadeq and
other government leaders, should clearly understand that, even if the authority
in the present Iranian legislation is in acceptable form, this does not mean
that funds will become available immediately, even if no delays are involved in
signing.
We are aware of the danger of the loan being over-played
in Iran with respect to its present financial difficulties, and this danger is
obviously enhanced by the loan's usefulness as a political instrument in the
present controversy with the British. We have instructed Ambassador Grady
to make it clear that the capital improvement projects contemplated in the loan
will not in the short run alleviate the present foreign exchange of rial shortages.
R