Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 November 15, 1951 By DEB NLT, Date 9-6-85 SECRED SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS UNITED KINGDOM Negotiations in London at the official level between the Foreign Office and Embassy London have resulted in a draft memorandum of agreement on Japanese- Formosan relations which, provided its expected acceptance is secured from Mr. Eden, will obviate the necessity of a higher level approach on the subject which the Department has been considering. The memoran- dum contains five principles: 1) Both governments recognize the im- portance on continuing to maintain a common front toward Japan on this question; 2) Both are still of the opinion that Japan's future attitude to- - ward China must necessarily be for determination by Japan itself; 3) Both recognize the desirability of avoiding any action which might later enable Japan to claim that her attitude toward China had been determined for her; 4) If, before the Treaty comes into force, Japan wishes to engage in pre- liminary discussions with the Chinese Nationalist Government with a view to regularizing its relations with the latter, neither the UK nor the US would have any objection, provided that no agreement arising from such preliminary discussions were to be concluded until after the multilateral peace treaty comes into force; and 5) Mr. Dulles will discuss with Sir Esler Dening in Tokyo, within the framework of the above principles, the problem of Japan's relations with Formosa and the attitude to be taken by our respective representatives in any discussions they may have with the Japanese Government on the subject. JAPAN Ambassador Sebald has advised that it would be unwise to solicit an invitation to Ambassa- dor Dulles to address the Japanese Diet during Dulles' forthcoming visit because it might be regarded as an effort to coerce the Diet on the various difficult and controversial questions relating to our post-treaty relations with Japan which will still remain after ratification of the peace treaty and security treaty. At the same time, the Japanese Government might be placed in an awkward position by the possible inference that Yoshida was enlisting Dulles' support in order to overcome Diet opposition. Moreover, any invitation to speak before the Diet would presumably have to be in the form of a joint resolution of both houses which would be subject to debate