Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

HLTC Mauel Aile) 291 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 December 4, 1951 By DEB NLT, Date 9-6-80 top SECRET SECURITY IFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EGYPT We have informed Ambassador Caffery that, despite the reduction in the number of inci- dents against the British in the Canal Zone, we are concerned by the Egyptian Government's continued support of and incitement to terrorist and obstructionist activities. We feel that unless the Egyptian Govern- ment can exercise more strenuous control there is little hope that a settlement can be reached along the lines which Serageddin has been suggesting- - - (i.e. British "troops" would be replaced by "technicians", and aircraft in the Canal Zone must be labelled "Egyptian" even though they might be flown by British pilots. We have therefore instructed Caffery to put squarely to Serageddin that attempts to settle the present situation are unlikely to succeed if the Government does not show itself more capable of suppressing terrorist and obstructionist activities and also of curbing the press in its continuing excursions into fantasy. Caffery is to say that while we are certain that the Four Powers which made the October 13 proposals are desirous of reaching a settlement, we are equally certain that the Four Powers could not do business with a Government which on the one hand expresses an interest in reaching a solution but on the other encourages a campaign of terrorism and untruths. DISARMAMENT Ambassador Austin reports that after the Mon- PROPOSALS day subcommittee sessions on the disarmament proposals Mr. Lloyd (UK) revived the suggestion which he already made earlier that there might be benefits if the three western powers could state their accepted concept of a declaration out- lawing atomic weapons, but which would only be effective when the con- trol system for atomic energy was already in operation, with the time of its effective operation to be determined by the Security Council. Austin comments that although Lloyd is inexperienced at negotiations with the Soviets he is modest and candid and is open to suggestions, and, although Austin sees possible dangers in Lloyd's proposed approach, he feels that it may not prove difficult to maintain tripartite solidarity in working on this subject. TOP SECRET SECURITY INEORMATION