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OCR Page 1 of 2OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12065,
1982
State Dept. DEB Guidelines, NLT, 02151-6-85 March 6,
December 6, 1951
By
SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
SAUDI ARABIA
Trouble is apparently brewing for the Arabian-
American Oil Company (Aramco) in the wake of
other Middle East oil difficulties. Messrs. Owen, the head of Aramco
in Arabia, and Hawkey, the Assistant Treasurer of Aramco, were re-
cently summoned by the Minister of Finance following several instances
of Arabian Government demands for special financial arrangements over
and beyond the present contractual arrangements. The Finance Minister
said the attitude of the Company in recent months had convinced him that
it was impossible to cooperate officially any longer. He mentioned as cases
in point the sterling problem (the Saudis want a higher percentage of dol-
lars than the present arrangement calls for), the Saudi demand for an
Arabian member on the Aramco board, and the alleged discovery by
auditors that Aramco's books were kept in New York (which our Em-
bassy says is not true).
Early this week Najib Salha, the Assistant Deputy
Minister of Finance, told Mr. Owen that he had himself been summoned
to see the Minister of Finance, who was obviously intoxicated and who
launched into a tirade against Aramco and finally instructed Salha to
send a telegram to the Customs Administration ordering it to cut off all
oil shipments (presumably through Tapline and Ras Tannura). Salha
told Owen that the order was fantastic and that he had not carrieditout,
hoping the Finance Minister might calm down and forget the instruction,
but the latter had instead followed up with a telephone call later on asking
if his instructions had been carried out.
Ambassador Hare, in commenting on the situation,
says that although the Minister of Finance has no serious ground for his
assertion of non-cooperation by Aramco, it is conceivable that in his
frequently befuddled state of mind he might have developed a phobia on
the subject as illustrated by his recent insistence on the transfer of the
Aramco Board to Dhahran. However, says Hare, he does have his lucid
moments and the consistent recurrence of his non-cooperation charge
leads to the conclusion that it represents deliberately adopted policy of
making things difficult for the Company.
SECRET SECURITY INFORMA TION