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OCR Page 1 of 2OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
May
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
January 2, 1952
State Dept. Guidelines, March 85 6, 1982
By DEB NLT, Date 9-4 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
INDOCHINA
Our Legation in Saigon has informed us that US
military intelligence available to the Legation does not
justify the view that major intervention by the Communists in Indochina is
imminent. The Legation states that it continues to regard the invasion as
a possible but not probable early eventuality.
FRANCE
Ambassador Bruce in Paris has informed us that the
Embassy has obtained the agreement of the French
Government to the text of our proposed warning statement regarding Korea
with the exception of one sentence. The French previously had set forth
a number of objections to our draft, and had indicated a desire to include
a specific reference to Indochina. The French feel strongly that our original
wording for the final paragraph is too much like an ultimatum for public
release at the time of an armistice. They favor issuing a public statement
couched in more general terms. They would, however, be agreeable to
communicating the substance of the final paragraph regarding the conse-
quences of renewed aggression privately to the Russians and also to the
Chinese Communists.
GERMANY
Our Ambassador in Paris has reported a lengthy con-
versation with German Chancellor Adenauer and the
latter's principal aides on the subject of the European Defense Force.
Adenauer believes that the French, Germans, and Italians should be able
to reach a substantial accord at the meeting in Paris except for the questions
of security control and the German financial contribution to the EDF. This
accord would tend to isolate the Benelux countries and Adenauer believes
that the US and UK should attempt to induce them to moderate their position
and reach a compromise acceptable to all. Adenauer thought that the ques-
tion of security controls should not prove too difficult. He believed that a
good deal of confusion had arisen in relation to this question because it had
been dealt with in many places and by many committees. With regard to
the German financial contribution, Adenauer felt very strongly that Germany's
economic and financial capabilities should be examined by the TCC Com-
mittee so that the same criteria would be applied to Germany as had been
applied to the NATO countries.
TOP SECRET SECURITY INE ORMATION