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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE May DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 January 2, 1952 State Dept. Guidelines, March 85 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 9-4 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS INDOCHINA Our Legation in Saigon has informed us that US military intelligence available to the Legation does not justify the view that major intervention by the Communists in Indochina is imminent. The Legation states that it continues to regard the invasion as a possible but not probable early eventuality. FRANCE Ambassador Bruce in Paris has informed us that the Embassy has obtained the agreement of the French Government to the text of our proposed warning statement regarding Korea with the exception of one sentence. The French previously had set forth a number of objections to our draft, and had indicated a desire to include a specific reference to Indochina. The French feel strongly that our original wording for the final paragraph is too much like an ultimatum for public release at the time of an armistice. They favor issuing a public statement couched in more general terms. They would, however, be agreeable to communicating the substance of the final paragraph regarding the conse- quences of renewed aggression privately to the Russians and also to the Chinese Communists. GERMANY Our Ambassador in Paris has reported a lengthy con- versation with German Chancellor Adenauer and the latter's principal aides on the subject of the European Defense Force. Adenauer believes that the French, Germans, and Italians should be able to reach a substantial accord at the meeting in Paris except for the questions of security control and the German financial contribution to the EDF. This accord would tend to isolate the Benelux countries and Adenauer believes that the US and UK should attempt to induce them to moderate their position and reach a compromise acceptable to all. Adenauer thought that the ques- tion of security controls should not prove too difficult. He believed that a good deal of confusion had arisen in relation to this question because it had been dealt with in many places and by many committees. With regard to the German financial contribution, Adenauer felt very strongly that Germany's economic and financial capabilities should be examined by the TCC Com- mittee so that the same criteria would be applied to Germany as had been applied to the NATO countries. TOP SECRET SECURITY INE ORMATION