Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT(NAVAL AIDE) 314 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 E.O. 12065, By DEB NLT, Date 9-9-85 January 15, 1952 TOP SEGRET SECURITY INFORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN In a conversation with Ambassador Henderson and our TCA Director in Iran, Prime Minister Mosadeq said that he must be frank in stating that unless outside help for the Iranian budget could be received, Iran would collapse within thirty days and further Point IV aid would be meaningless. The salaries of soldiers, police and civilian employees in the province of Azerbaijan, "which is almost in the mouth of Russia have been overdue for twenty days. The Governor General has telegraphed that if payment is not made soon he cannot be responsible for the consequences. The budgetary position is desperate. Iran has exhausted cash on hand except for $8 millionfrom the International Monetary Fund which is being held for emergency pur poses. Mosadeq said he was talking with utmost earnestness. "If Iran does not receive outside financial aid it will collapse and there will be a Communist revolution within thirty days. " He then asked if the US could not lend Iran ten or fifteen million pounds (sterling) with oil as security or arrange for some US oil company to distribute oil. When Henderson pointed out that purchase or sale by the US of oil in which the British continue to claim an interest would be sure to lead to serious complications, Mosadeq intimated the US would be ort-sighted if it would prefer Iran go Communist to hurting the feelings of the British. He suggested the Embassy tell Washington that if he could not have as- surances within five days that the US was prepared to come to Iran's fi- - nancial assistance he would have to make such a deal as he could with the Russians. If he had no reason to believe US aid was coming he must quickly try to sell oil and everything else exportable which Iran has. Henderson reports that he has never seen Mosadeq more tired or depressed. It was clear that his mind was completely closed so far as oil is concerned except for some solution which the Bri- tish, in their present frame of mind, would not accept. Mosadeq seems to prefer to go down in history as a man who led his country to ruin than as merely another Persian who bowed to what he regards as British TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION