Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (NAVAL AIDE) 316 the E.O. 12065, Guidelines, Sec. March 3-10? 6, 1982 DECLASSIFIED OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON State By DEB Dept. NLT, Date 9-9-81 January 21, 1952 TOP SECRET SECURITY INF OR MA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN Upon being informed that his request for financial assistance had been received by the US Government, Prime Minister Mosadeq asked Ambassador Henderson again to telegraph Washington stressing the urgency of his request. Mosadeq told Henderson that he could wait only a few more days before making a really serious effort to obtain the funds and was prepared, if necessary, to meet the emer- gency by selling oil at half price to various prospective buyers, including members of the Soviet bloc. When Henderson observed that this was a complex matter that could not be handled as rapidly as Mosadeq seemed to believe, the Prime Minister replied that after all he was not asking for a gift but a loan that would be repaid just as soon as Iranian oil was again moving. Ambassador Henderson also talked to Mosadeq about street agitators who, for the past three days, had been demanding the closing of all US Consulates in Iran. Mosadeq assured Henderson that he would not yield to such pressure and that the US Consulates were welcome since they had not been interfering in Iranian affairs. Henderson remarked that his government felt the consulates benefited both countries but that the US did not try to operate consular offices where they were not welcome. USSR Charge Cumming in Moscow believes that the additional restrictions on foreign travel in the USSR, announced by the Soviets on January 15, reflect a hyper-sensitive attitude of the Soviet Government on security matters. Cumming further feels that the travel restrictions were as much designed to conceal weaknesses in the Soviet economy as to hide any conversion of industry to military ends. Since the Soviets could always prevent foreign travel by various indirect devices and because Soviet propaganda has attempted to portray the USSR as freely open to such travel, Cumming thinks that the recent Soviet decision was not taken lightly. He suggests that the concealment of an accelerating Soviet military orientation in 1952 and the administrative complexity involved in preventing travel to areas officially open, but closed in fact, were among the motiva- tions for this decision and that its pronouncement was facilitated by the recent propaganda barrage against alleged Western espionage. TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION