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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT (Naval Adel347
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
DE
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
April 4, 1952
By DED NLT, Date 9-9-85
TOP SECRET SECURITY INE ORMA TION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
TRIESTE
The first meeting of the US, British and Italian representa- -
tives on the Trieste problem was held in the British Foreign
Office yesterday. The Italians expressed the "great expectation" of the
Italian public and the importance which their Government attached to these
talks. They noted that the demonstrations had ceased pending the pre -
sumedly favorable outcome of the talks and added that if the outcome were
"disappointing" it could also "have a negative effect on the helpful and
friendly relations" in the Atlantic Pact. They also stressed that they
wished the talks to be brief and secret.
The Italian Ambassador acknowledged that although the
talks were limited to Zone A and were ostensibly technical and adminis- -
trative in nature they were basically political. He said the Italian objec
-
tive was to "establish a fair balance between the situations in Zone A and
B" that whereas in Zone B Tito ruled with full power and had carried out
a ruthless denationalization, Italy had no role in the administration of
Zone A, where Allied Military Government policy endeavored to keep the
Italians and Yugoslavs at arms length and tended to foster "selfish in-
dependentism--the root of all the troubles". The Ambassador stressed
that the present talks should aim at bringing about a temporary arrange -
ment which would not prejudice the solution of the problem as a whole.
The British and American representatives asked the Italians to present
specific proposals and the latter agreed to do so at their meeting today.
Meanwhile an intelligence report from Trieste indicates
that the Italian Government has decided that the present moment is not
propitious for a political settlement of the Trieste problem which would
favor Italian demands and that a final settlement should await a more
suitable international situation. Therefore, they should not seek to
place Italian troops in Trieste. Their objective at present, according
to the report, will be merely to have: 1) Allied Military Government
laws in Trieste that are more equal or parallel or integrated into
Italian laws; 2) a new spirit in the Military administration based on the
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION