Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLTCNavel Aide)48 DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON DECLASSMED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 July 3, 1950 By DEB NTT, Date 6-5-85 T op S E € R E SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS USSR Ambassador Kirk in Moscow assessing the current Soviet attitude in regard to the Korean situation states that the USSR is poised to jump either way. If the North Korean invasion is repelled and the full power of the western world manifested in a prompt and decisive defeat of the Communist-inspired attack, then the Kremlin will be in a nice position to remain aloof and disclaim any responsibility for what would doubtless be described as a regrettable "civil war. " On the other hand should the North Korean forces meet with military successes or should the struggle become protracted with the issue uncertain, despite whatever strength the western powers are able and willing to commit, it is then conceivable that the Soviets would give more and more support to North Korea, either openly or by subter- - fuge, following the pattern of the Spanish civil war. Stressing the urgency of our earliest military success, Kirk says he is sure the Politburo will be governed by the military results which will constitute the kind of cold facts upon which their realistic attitude will be based, completely unconditioned by any emotional or altruistic sentiments. Kirk concludes by giving his fullest concurrence with whatever action we and our allies can take to inflict at the earliest moment the most complete and crushing defeat upon the North Korean forces since every day of delay in stopping their advance increases our problem and will shortly operate to reduce our prestige in all Asia as well as in the friendly western world. Meanwhile, we have emphasized to Embassy Moscow the importance of using all possible sources for obtaining indications of Soviet reaction and intentions, reporting immediately the slightest change of tone or emphasis when such occurs. We point out that in 1939 the Embassy obtained the initial tip on the Soviet march into Poland from questions asked an agitator speaking in the Park of Culture and Rest. TPSECRET