Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Navel Aide)HIG OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE the WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 12065, Sec. 3-402 November 14, 1950 State Dept. DEB NLT, Date G-10-25 TOP SECREI By SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA We have sent to Ambassador Austin in New York our views on the handling of the Korean case in the UN, which stress that we must play our hand in the UN with some care in order to achieve the objectives we seek to obtain from UN consideration, particularly since there is no reliable and accurate picture of ultimate Chinese Communist objectives and since the immediate military situa- tion in Korea is unclear. These objectives are: 1) to localize the Korean conflict, to bring about withdrawal of Chinese forces, and prevent a world war or a general engagement between the Chinese Communists and UN forces with all of the consequences that might follow; 2) to obtain the maximum support from the international community for such action as may be required under various contingencies if the character and extent of Chinese intervention change for the worse; and 3) to bring about a final settlement of the Korean question along the lines of the October 7 resolution. We pointed out to Austin that while it would be comparatively simple to brand the Chinese Communists as aggressors in the UN, our overall national interest does not permit this course and we must be care- - ful in the political field not to run substantially ahead of the situation on the gr ound in such a way as to commit us to a heavy involvement in Asia, which we should try to avoid. We informed Austin that: 1) the speed with which we should push Security Council consideration depends to some ex- tent on planned military operations and on the timing of the arrival of the Chinese Communist representatives at the UN; and 2) we should not make now a firm public commitment that the Korea case will be brought imme- - diately to the General Assembly following the anticipated Soviet veto in the Council, although the present prospect is that we will want Assembly consideration. We indicated that if the Chinese Communist position is "negotiable" we may find some move on their part or by other govern- ments to find a negotiating procedure which would be more effective than a full debate in the Assembly. Meanwhile, we have instructed certain of our Ambassadors to discuss with the Foreign Ministers in the countries to which they are accredited the grave problem confronting US forces in Korea through the use of Manchuria by the enemy as a sanctuary for forces which are in fact attacking UN forces in Korea itself. Since the use of Manchuria in this manner could easily impose an intolerable R