Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Naval Aide) 129 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON December 5, 1950 State By Dept. DEB NLT, Date 6-18-87 E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 12065, SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS UNITED NATIONS UN Secretary General Lie and Indian delegate Rau in separate discussions with the Chinese Communist delegate Wu received the clear impression that the demands of the Chinese Communist Government for the settlement of the Korean question were: 1) withdrawal of UN troops from Korea; 2) withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from Formosa, and 3) seating of the Chinese Com- munist representative in the UN. Both Lie and Rau advanced proposals for an immediate cease-fire and some form of "heutralized zone" in Korea. Wu did not comment on these proposals but said that he would transmit them to Peking and expected to receive instructions from his government tomorrow. In a further discussion with Wu and Chiao on December 3, Rau added an additional suggestion to his original proposal that, following agreement on a cease-fire and a demilitarized zone to be promptly negotiated, there should be a conference among representatives of the "great powers" to discuss those questions which would clearly re- main for discussion. Rau made it clear that Chinese Communist repre- - sentatives would participate in these meetings. Wu said that he would transmit this suggestion to his government and also expected a reply to this point by tomorrow. According to Rau, Wu voiced very strong feeling against 'the American ruling circles" and insisted that the Peking Government held the firm belief that the US is intent on war with China. In discussing these proposals with Ambassador Gross and UK delegates Jebb and Younger, Rau stated that: 1) he had not implied a commitment to Wu to convene a meeting of "great powers" following a cease-fire and establishment of a demilitarized zone; 2) he had not discussed with Wu the details of his concept of a demilitarized zone; and 3) he had given no thought to the administration of such a zone. Rau further expressed the view that the question of Formosa appeared to be uppermost in the minds of the Chinese Communists. Rau said that Wu made it clear in the dis - cussions that the importance attached to Formosa by the Chinese Com- munists was grounded in large part upon their belief that it was the purpose of the US to keep Chiang in power on Formosa with a well supplied armed force which would stand as a constant threat to the mainland and therefore FOPSECRDT