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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT (Naval Aide) 133
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
December 11, 1950
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
I
By, DEB NLT, Date 6-18-85
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
WESTERN EUROPE
We have concurred in the view of the Belgian
Foreign Minister that, upon the successful
conclusion of the meetings of the North Atlantic Council Deputies and the
Military Committee in London, a meeting of the North Atlantic Council
at the Foreign Minister level should be held in Brussels with the Defense
Ministers present. In this connection we have suggested that the Council
meeting will be scheduled for December 18-19 and that arrangements be
made for private discussions between the US, UK, and French Foreign
Ministers after the Council meetings on an approach to the Germans
regarding German participation in western European defense. The
preliminary reactions received to date from Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg and France indicate that our proposals and the suggested
dates for the meetings are acceptable.
UNITED NATIONS
Indian UN delegate Rau will meet today with
representatives from a group of Asian countries
to discuss a draft resolution on a cease-fire proposal for Korea in the
hope that an agreed resolution can be tabled in the UN on Tuesday. This
action followed a series of conversations Rau held over the week-end
with the Chinese Communist delegation and with the US and UK delegations
and conversations between our delegation and representatives of a group
of Asian countries who are drafting a cease-fire proposal. Rau informed
our delegate Gross that, while his views had not yet crystallized, his
draft resolution for a cease-fire would contain the following elements: 1)
a call for an immediate cessation of hostilities; 2) provision for a truce
machinery to assist and supervise the making and execution of arrange. -
ments to effect the cease-fire; 3) some provision for negotiations on the
Korean question after the cease-fire has been effectuated. Gross
emphasized very strongly that we wanted to avoid any implication what-
ever that an indication of willingness on our part to consider other
questions after establishment of the cease-fire constituted a price for a
cease-fire. Gross reiterated our position as previously expressed to
Rau that: 1) we were not soliciting or taking any initiative toward a cease-
fire arrangement and are not suggesting that anyone else do so; and 2)