Memorandum No. 3 Conclusions of the Cuba Study Group

was particularly the case on the night of D+1 when an appreciation of the ammunition situation would have resulted in an appeal for U.S. air cover and an all-out effort to supply the beach by all available means. " h. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had the important responsibility of examin- ing into the military feasibility of this operation. By acquiescing in the ZAPATA Plan, they gave the impression to others of approving it although they had expressed their preference for TRINIDAD at the outset, a point an n't which apparently never reached the senior civilian officials. As a body they reviewed the successive changes of the plan piecemeal and only within a limited context, a procedure which vas inadequate for a proper examination of all the military ramifications. Individually, they had differing under- standings of important features of the operation apparently arising from oral, briefings in the absence of written documents. 1. Although the intelligence was not perfect, particularly as to the evaluation of the effectiveness of the T-33's, ve do not feel that any failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat. 1. The planning and conduct of the operation vould have been improved if there had been an initial statement of governmental policy; assigning" the mission and setting the guidelines within which it was to develop. There- after, there was a need for a formalized procedure for interdepartmental coordination and follov-up with adequate record-keeping of decisions. . 2. In the light of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the preparations and execution of paremilitary operations such as ZAPATA are form of Cold War action in which the country mist be prepared to engage. If it does so, it must engage in it with a maximum chance of success. Such opera- tions should be planned and executed by a governmental mechanism capable of bringing into play, in addition to military and covert techniques, all other forces, political, economic, ideological, and intelligence, which can contribute to its success. No such mechanism presently exists but should be created to plan, coordinate and further a national Cold War strategy capable of including paramilitary operations. -3-